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INTRODUCTION
C ONTRARY to the views of many commentators, the Efficient Capi-
tal Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), as originally framed in financial
economics, was not "disproven" by the Subprime Crisis of 2007-2008,
nor has it been shown to be irrelevant to the project of regulatory reform
of financial markets. To the contrary, the ECMH points to commonsense
reforms in the wake of the Crisis, some of which have already been
adopted. The Crisis created a lot of losers-from individual investors to
pension funds and German Landesbanken-who purchased mortgage-
backed securities that they did not, and perhaps could not, understand,
and it cost them extraordinary amounts of money as a result. Perhaps
more significantly, the knock-on effects of the Subprime Crisis rippled
through the finance markets, pushed Lehman Brothers over the edge,
decimated other financial institutions across the world, and resulted in
massive provisions of government assistance and sometimes the full na-
tionalization or failure of financial institutions and even giant industrial
enterprises such as General Motors and Chrysler. Moreover, the damag-
ing consequences of the Subprime Crisis continue. America's recovery
is fragile. The Great Recession of 2008-2010 is also the backdrop for
Europe's sovereign debt and banking crisis that still lingers today. Some
smaller European nations-including Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and Por-
tugal-required large international aid packages, and even larger coun-
tries such as Italy and Spain were at risk of default prior to decisive in-
tervention by the European Central Bank. The resulting pressure to slash
government spending threatens political stability across Europe. The re-
cent political Sturm und Drang in the United States over budget deficits
and debt limits reflects similar sharply divided views about the causes
and policy implication of the Crisis.
Against this backdrop, one might think it of small consequence that
the Subprime Crisis is also said to have dealt major setbacks to academic
theories, most particularly the ECMH.' After all, the only loss that fol-
'Macroeconomic theory has also suffered a reputation loss. As Robert Hall has pointed
out, neoclassical macroeconomics does not explain why drops in output and employment
persist for significant periods after a financial crisis is resolved. Robert E. Hall, Why Does
the Economy Fall to Pieces after a Financial Crisis?, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 7 (2010). Hall ar-
gues that the persistence is caused by an increase in financial frictions, particularly infor-
mation costs, which survive for significant periods after the immediate crisis is resolved. Id.;
Robert E. Hall, The High Sensitivity of Economic Activity to Financial Frictions, 121 Econ.
J. 351, 351, 353 (2011). As we develop in Part III, a similar phenomenon exists with respect
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lows a crisis in theory-as opposed to a debilitating crisis in the econo-
my-is damage to the egos of the academics who defend or reject a con-
tested theory. Indeed, academic theories (unlike economies) thrive on
contradiction to make advances, a point famously stressed by Thomas
Kuhn almost fifty years ago.2
Nevertheless, the particular iteration of theory and response attending
the ECMH after the Subprime Crisis differs importantly from other en-
counters between theory and seemingly inconvenient facts. The reason is
that the ECMH had moved beyond the academic community beginning
in the 1970s, and has played a prominent role in the larger world politi-
cal debate and regulatory reform ever since. One or another interpreta-
tion of the ECMH has influenced regulatory policy for well over thirty
years.3 As a result, the public understanding of the limits of the ECMH
is not just a matter of academic debate; it carries real political conse-
quences. Important regulatory implications follow if the ECMH itself is
held partially responsible for the Subprime Crisis.
4
Thus, the rise and fall of the ECMH is as much a political story as a
story about a contested academic theory. A theory that enters the realm
of politics is inevitably refashioned by political actors to serve political
ends. The ECMH was hijacked by a powerful political clientele during
the Reagan era, if not before, and was transformed, at least in the eyes of
the public, from a narrow but important academic theory about the in-
to market efficiency. Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, and Ronald J. Gilson argue that crisis-
related changes in information costs also explain another financial crisis-related phenome-
non: the increase in unsystematic risk in stock prices that has accompanied every financial
crisis since the early twentieth century. Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gil-
son, Economic Crisis and Share Price Unpredictability: Reasons and Implications 1-8
(Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. For Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 468, 2014), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract=2401712.
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 6 (1962).
3 These range from Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules allowing corpora-
tions to incorporate by reference information contained in already-filed documents into short
form registration statements, to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988), which by allowing reliance to be presumed in a securities fraud
class action if the plaintiffs show that the relevant market was efficient, provides the doctri-
nal foundation that makes securities class actions economically feasible. See infra note 5.
4 See, e,g., George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psycholo-
gy Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 1-3 (2009); John Cassi-
dy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities 3-14 (2009); Justin Fox, The
Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street xi-
xvi (2009); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modem Financial
Markets 1-6 (Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract - 1916649.
3152014]
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 100:313
formational underpinnings of market prices into a broad ideological jus-
tification for preferring market outcomes over regulation. In this sense,
the ECMH was itself the subject of an artificial bubble. It was inflated to
provide a scientific justification for claims about the accuracy and mean-
ing of market prices that were much more far-reaching than it could
support. Now that these claims no longer seem plausible, the bubble has
burst and the credibility of the ECMH has plummeted. The danger to-
day, in our view, is that academics and regulators may overreact to the
prior overstatement of the implications of the ECMH by deregulatory
partisans, and in so doing overlook the valuable policy insights that an
appropriately "sized" ECMH can provide.' It follows that the ECMH
must be returned to its original dimensions to preserve its narrower, but
still important, intellectual value for regulators and policymakers.
In Part I, we explain how the slippery notion of "fundamental effi-
ciency" first inflated the ECMH into a brief for the broad deregulation of
the markets and now is deployed by critics to demonstrate that the
ECMH is empirically and theoretically wrong. In the first case, the
ECMH was badly overstated by assuming the convergence of informa-
5 The continuing status of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine under Basic is a good example.
That doctrine makes a securities fraud class action economically feasible by dispensing with
individual proof of reliance where the security in question is traded in an efficient market.
See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. The idea is that an efficient market incorporates a mis-
statement or omission into the security's price, and traders can be presumed to rely on that
price. Proof of an efficient market is therefore a condition to the certification of a plaintiff's
class. See, e.g., id. A fair reading of the opinions in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196-97 (2013), decided after the Subprime Crisis
and holding that a plaintiff was not required to prove the materiality of a misstatement or
omission at the time of class certification, is that there are four votes to grant certiorari to
reconsider Basic. It is also a fair concern that at least part of the motivation is a misunder-
standing of market efficiency. See id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of
the Court with the understanding that the petitioners did not ask us to revisit Basic's fraud-
on-the-market presumption. As the dissent observes, more recent evidence suggests that the
presumption may rest on a faulty economic premise. In light of this development, reconsid-
eration of the Basic presumption may be appropriate." (internal citations omitted)); id. at
1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding does not merely accept what some consider
the regrettable consequences of the four-Justice opinion in Basic .... ); id. at 1208 n.4
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Basic decision is itself questionable .... [T]he Court has not
been asked to revisit Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption. I thus limit my dissent to
demonstrating that the Court is not following Basic's dictates. Moreover, the Court acknowl-
edges there is disagreement as to whether market efficiency is a binary, yes or no question,
or instead operates differently depending on the information at issue .... " (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Not surprisingly, the Court has now granted certiorari with respect to
the question of whether Basic should be overruled. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co.,
718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013).
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tional and fundamental efficiency; in the second, the ECMH is badly
understated by the claim that the potential divergence between informa-
tional and fundamental efficiency deprives the ECMH of any signifi-
cance for regulatory policy. As we describe below, fundamental effi-
ciency means that investors get the correct price when they purchase
securities in competitive financial markets-the discounted present val-
ue of expected cash flows associated with a security. Informational effi-
ciency means only that stock prices respond quickly to the release of
new public information. The difference is inherent in testing whether an
efficient market price is also fundamentally efficient. In perfect mar-
kets-ones in which all information relevant to determining a security's
fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms by which
that information comes to be reflected in the securities market price op-
erate without friction-fundamental and informational efficiency coin-
cide.6 But where all value-relevant information is not publicly available
and/or the mechanisms of market efficiency operate with frictions, the
coincidence is an empirical question both as to the informational effi-
ciency of prices and their relation to fundamental value. Answering that
empirical question thus requires a yardstick-an observable measure of
fundamental value against which the market price can be compared. And
here the problem arises-market prices are observable and fundamental
value is not.
We argue in this Article that informational efficiency and fundamen-
tal efficiency are related: Even if we cannot observe fundamental effi-
ciency, we can with confidence predict that making prices more infor-
mationally efficient will move them in the direction of fundamental
efficiency. But there is no single yardstick of fundamental value against
which market prices can be compared. This point is made most clearly
by reference to a famous quip by American comedian Henny Young-
6 Despite the availability of all value-relevant information and the frictionless operation of
the mechanisms that cause that information to be reflected in securities prices, one can still
imagine that prices will not be fundamentally efficient. This would be because the market
applies the wrong asset-pricing model to that information as a result of behavioral biases.
See Econ. Sci. Prize Comm. of the Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., Understanding Asset Pric-
es: Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory
of Alfred Nobel 31 (2013) [hereinafter Nobel Prize Committee Report], available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/advanced-
economicsciences2013.pdf (surveying behavior explanations for asset pricing). Note, how-
ever, that there may be no clear line between a market that employs the wrong model and an
observer's misunderstanding of what investors do value-that is, the market model may be
right and we simply fail to understand investors' utility function.
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man. When asked by an acquaintance, "How's your wife?" Youngman
replied without hesitation, "Compared to what?"7 In the end, the regula-
tory choice always comes down to comparing the accuracy of the mar-
ket's valuation at a point in time with another yardstick of fundamental
value calculated at the same moment in time. Nevertheless, we argue
throughout this Article, and most conspicuously in Part I, that informa-
tionally efficient market prices are related to fundamental value through
the availability of value-relevant information and market mechanisms
that cause that information to be reflected in security prices. For policy
purposes, increasing informational efficiency pushes market prices in
the direction of fundamental value, even if fundamental value is not ob-
servable, and so supports the policy agenda we set out in Part IV. (In-
deed, we believe this to be a consensus view among prominent critics of
the ECMH even if it is seldom stated.8)
Part II locates the ECMH historically as the common element in the
foundational theories of modem finance and briefly reprises our own
prior efforts to assess the effects of market frictions on informational ef-
ficiency. The foundational theories of financial economics-including
the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model-are rooted in the assumption that nothing matters in per-
fect markets because costless arbitrage eliminates mispricing and penal-
izes bad financial strategies. A perfect market is one in which prices are
fundamentally and informationally efficient. But such a market is just a
helpful construct, a useful platform from which to begin the investiga-
tion of real markets with numerous frictions (or imperfections) ranging
from imperfect information to agency costs and defective market struc-
tures. Investigation of how these frictions affect securities prices has
generated a vast literature in financial economics and a smaller but still
considerable legal literature devoted to market regulation. Our particular
contribution to this literature has been to show that the informational ef-
ficiency of market prices must be understood as relative rather than ab-
solute, that is, that prices respond to new information more or less rapid-
7 Gregory Bateson & Henny Youngman, The Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy, and
the Humanities, http://www.ralphmag.org/FI/why.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
8 See, e.g., Gene D'Avolio, Efi Gildor & Andrei Shleifer, Technology, Information Pro-
duction, and Market Efficiency 1, 17, 30 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 1929, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=286597 (advocating strong efforts to
increase the informational efficiency of market prices even though the authors are market
efficiency skeptics).
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ly rather than instantly or not at all. The speed with which prices reflect
a particular "bit" of new information depends on the cost characteristics
of the information and the transaction costs of trading on it. Therefore,
the ECMH should be understood as a theory about the relative informa-
tional efficiency of market prices, which is inherently a context-specific
inquiry.9
Part III of this Article assesses the Subprime Crisis in light of a
properly framed ECMH-that is, one that conceives of the market's rel-
ative informational efficiency as a function of the level of market fric-
tions with respect to both the availability of value-relevant information
and the mechanisms through which that information is reflected in pric-
es. We stress here that information of great relevance to pricing some of
the instruments associated with the Subprime Crisis was very costly-
too costly, in fact, to enter into the pricing of these instruments. In addi-
tion, market structure generally made trading on information about these
securities costly or impossible (because over most of the relevant period
there was no secondary market at all). In such a setting, the ECMH pre-
dicts that markets will be relatively less efficient, as in fact they were.
We also review explanations of a less technical matter: Why did sophis-
ticated investors purchase these instruments of limited liquidity that they
could not price? Of the various explanations to be found in the Crisis lit-
erature, we argue that the most persuasive are those that turn on rational
but wrong beliefs about the U.S. residential housing market (that is, high
information costs for all market participants including the regulators)
and the poorly-aligned incentives of key market intermediaries, includ-
ing the major investment banks and the rating agencies. Alternative ex-
planations that invoke "cognitive bias" to explain the behavior of institu-
tional investors and, hence, the divergence between observed and
fundamental value, are less persuasive.'°
9 Thus, in our view, Basic has always been wrong in framing the standard for a presump-
tion of reliance as whether the market was efficient. Market efficiency is a continuum, not a
single condition. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Ef-
ficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 554-61 (1984). As a result, the proper standard for the pre-
sumption is whether a misstatement affected the price of the stock at issue. For an argument
that the Supreme Court should adopt this position in its reconsideration of Basic, see Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic 19 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., &
Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 756, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2371304.
10 Psychology may play a much larger role in assessing the behavior of homebuyers in the
subprime and alt-prime markets. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psy-
chology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1119 (2009). However,
2014]
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Finally, we turn in Part IV to an assessment of whether an appropri-
ately sized ECMH has policy lessons for regulators in a post-Crisis
world. As noted above, we argue throughout this Article that while the
informational efficiency of prices is related to the fundamental values of
securities, the ECMH standing alone cannot definitively determine
whether securities are mispriced relative to their fundamental value be-
cause fundamental value is not observable." However, making prices
more informationally efficient will move them in the direction of fun-
damental efficiency. In this Part, we illustrate how regulators can use the
ECMH to enhance the informational efficiency of prices and thereby
push prices toward the theoretical (and aspirational) fundamental value.
More informationally efficient market prices can also better inform
regulators. There is reason to believe, for example, that the Federal Re-
serve had no better information concerning the instruments underlying
mortgage-backed securities and derivatives than did the market. 2 If so,
more informed market prices might have allowed for more calibrated
and more prompt regulatory intervention. Alternatively, prices that fail
to respond to low-cost, value-relevant information raise a red flag. The
reason may be thin trading or a flawed market structure, but it may also
be that public-sector agency costs impede or distort market activity. 3
Thus, attention to the extent to which market prices are informationally
efficient should be viewed as a complement to effective regulation, not
as a substitute.
We address several kinds of regulatory intervention that can increase
informational efficiency and enhance transparency, ranging from the
obvious step of enhancing disclosure, to the introduction of stress testing
for financial institutions, and to direct intervention in shaping the market
for novel securities such as the collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs")
and residential mortgage-backed securities ("RMBSs"). Our intention is
the less likely it is that a borrower would be able to make her mortgage payments after the
teaser rates expired on a no-down-payment loan, the more rational a borrower's strategy to
live in the house to be financed at a greatly subsidized cost for the term of the teaser rate.
11 Luigi Zingales frames the point nicely: "[T]his implication of the [ECMH] is not a good
theory in the Popperian sense (after philosopher Karl Popper) because it is almost impossible
to reject." Luigi Zingales, Learning to Live with Not-So-Efficient Markets, 139 J. Am. Acad.
Arts & Sci. 31, 36 (2010).
12 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
13 By "public sector agency costs," we mean the response of regulators to political pres-
sure. One example is the misaligned incentives of a regulator who must decide whether to
dampen trading in a market from which institutions with powerful lobbies are profiting.
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less to make specific reform proposals-indeed, some reforms we ad-
dress have already been adopted-than it is to demonstrate how the
ECMH can usefully inform regulatory reform and, conversely, how
some widely-accepted reforms implemented in the wake of the Crisis
depend, at least implicitly, on the assumption that there is likely to be a
correlation between the informational efficiency of market prices and
fundamental value.
1. "INFORMATIONAL" VERSUS "FUNDAMENTAL" EFFICIENCY
As conventionally understood, a market is informationally efficient if
investors cannot make abnormal returns by trading on public infor-
mation.14 Note that this definition says nothing about the relationship be-
tween informational efficiency and the fundamental value of securities.
An informationally efficient price may move closer to fundamental effi-
ciency if the market price would change should non-public information
become public, or if frictions associated with the mechanism by which
information becomes reflected in price were reduced.
By contrast the fundamental value of a security is conventionally un-
derstood to be the true present value of its expected future cash flows as
these cash flows are estimated and discounted by the market's valuation
model, which is usually presumed to be fixed across markets and as-
sets. 5 It follows that a market is fundamentally efficient if prices accu-
rately track the fundamental values of securities-in colloquial terms, if
the market price is right. 16 Defenders of this ambitious notion of funda-
14 The definition in the text encompasses weak form and semi-strong form efficiency-
that is, efficiency with respect to past and current information. Strong-form efficiency, in
contrast, requires that the market price also reflect private information-that is, information
that is not public at all.
15 Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 9-22, 27, provides empirical evidence of the impact
of idiosyncratic risk on an increase in uncertainty concerning the market's valuation model.
16 Fundamental efficiency, thus, is quite different from strong form efficiency; the latter
posits that private information is reflected in market price; the former claims that the market
price is "correct." Judge Easterbrook, who knows better, conflates the two in Schleicher v.
Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). He correctly describes weak form and semi-strong
form efficiency as covering historical prices and newly released information, but then states
that "[t]he strong version adds a claim that the price set in this way is right, in the sense that
it accurately reflects the firm's value." Id. In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit gets it right when the court states what is necessary to trigger the presumption of reli-
ance provided by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine from Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988):
20141
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mental efficiency concede that perfection is impossible: Market traders
can know only public information, not the private information of corpo-
rate managers or the contingent outcomes of future events. But this
"good enough" fundamental efficiency is often the standard by which
the ECMH has been judged in the wake of the Subprime Crisis. And
even "good enough" fundamental efficiency raises an awkward ques-
tion: How do traders know the model that should be applied in discount-
ing future cash flows? And for that matter, how do the critics who assert
that the ECMH is discredited because it fails the "good enough" criteri-
on of market efficiency know the market's valuation model so they can
compare the market price to that dictated by the valuation model?
As noted above, the empirical problem is the absence of a reference
point against which to measure market prices. If the prices of mortgage-
backed securities are asserted to have been inefficient before and after
the onset of the Subprime Crisis, the obvious riposte is: "As compared to
what?" As noted above, even "good enough" fundamental value must be
measurable to see if it differs from market price. Yet as Richard Roll
pointed out with respect to empirically testing the Capital Asset Pricing
Model ("CAPM"),17 if we cannot measure the price that CAPM dictates
because the market portfolio is not observable, we cannot make the
price-value comparison either with respect to magnitude or even direc-
tion. Put simply, there is nothing against which to measure market price.
The best we can do is find a more or less plausible proxy for the market
portfolio such as a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks. A finding that market
price differs from fundamental value (as measured by CAPM or another
For purposes of establishing the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, we
adopt the prevailing definition of market efficiency, which provides that an efficient
market is one in which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly availa-
ble information. By "fully reflect," we mean that market price responds so quickly to
new information that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits on the basis of
such information. This is known as "informational efficiency." We reject a second and
much broader meaning of "fully reflect," known as "fundamental value efficiency,"
which requires that a market respond to information not only quickly but accurately,
such that the market price of a stock reflects its fundamental value.
In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005); see also In re Country-
wide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 610 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Apple Com-
puter Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1989)) (affirming that fraud-on-the-
market cases are concerned with informational efficiency).
17 We discuss the Capital Asset Pricing Model infra in this Part and in Part II.
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valuation model) is consistent with either an informationally inefficient
market or an incorrect pricing model.'8
Roll's alternative explanations for a discrepancy between a pricing
model's prediction (or a prediction of a proxy for a pricing model) and
observable market prices, however, have very different implications if
market efficiency is used in both its positive and normative senses: We
want to know if markets are informationally efficient, and we want some
handle on how to make prices fundamentally efficient. The policy goal
is to eliminate frictions. Informationally efficient markets can then make
it easier to determine whether the pricing model we employ as a proxy
for the "true" but unobservable valuation model underlying fundamental
value is a reasonable one, or whether, alternatively, market prices seem
to be largely random or a function of "animal spirits" rather than mean-
ingful economic valuation.
Now consider the ECMH from the standpoint of a sophisticated critic
of both its fundamental efficiency and informational efficiency variants.
With respect to fundamental efficiency, no sophisticated critic of the
ECMH would claim to know the market's "true" valuation model with
certainty. Rather, she would make one of two arguments depending on
which form of efficiency was at issue. In the case of fundamental effi-
ciency, she would argue that it is possible to develop more or less plau-
sible proxies for the unobservable "true" model-and that, in fact, such
models are developed routinely by investors. These proxy models then
can be back-tested in a rough way: The more closely a proxy model's ex
ante predictions approach the observable actual present value of the cash
payouts from holding securities, the better they are likely to be at repli-
cating the "true" model. Correlatively, if we observe ex post that a given
proxy model predicts the ex ante present values of future payouts better
than contemporaneous market prices, then these market prices were
plausibly inefficient in the fundamental sense (even if they were effi-
cient in the informational sense because arbitrage profits were not possi-
ble). The empirical work of the 2013 Nobelist Robert Shiller illustrates
8 Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests: Part I: On Past and Poten-
tial Testability of the Theory, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 129, 130 (1977) (testing difficulties arising
from an incomplete proxy for market portfolio). This point has become commonplace in the
market efficiency debate. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 388 (1970); Zingales, supra note 11, at 32 (stat-
ing that if we reject the equality of market price and fundamental value, "it is unclear wheth-
er that entails rejecting the asset-pricing model that assesses the fundamental value or reject-
ing the [ECMH]").
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this kind of critique of fundamental efficiency (that is, what we term the
"inflated" ECMH).1 9 Finally, the critic would note that valuation models
change. Unpredictable economic crises-the result of Knightian uncer-
tainty, not the resolution of probabilities observable ex ante-result in
the erosion of confidence that the pre-crisis valuation model still was
valid in the post-crisis world. As a consequence, price volatility will in-
crease as the number of pieces of new information with implications for
stock prices increases because a range of different models, with respect
to which different information is value-relevant, may turn out to be pre-
dictive post-crisis.20
A sophisticated critic of the ECMH also would address informational
efficiency, which rests at the heart of a modest ECMH. Evaluating the
informational efficiency of market prices is important in its own right
and because it is a prerequisite for fundamental efficiency. Whatever
else may be said about the theoretical construct of fundamental value, it
must certainly be true that a security's fundamental value incorporates
all available information that bears on the discounted value of its ex-
pected future cash flows. Her claim with respect to the informational in-
efficiency of particular markets would be that the release of public in-
formation with obvious negative implications for market prices under
any reasonable valuation model did not in fact affect these prices, or,
still worse, seemed to pressure them in the wrong direction.
In response to this argument, a defender of the ECMH would readily
agree that there are circumstances and markets in which price does devi-
ate from any plausible notion of value for reasons that have little to do
with information. The classic example is a "fire sale" in which sellers
must liquidate their inventories for exogenous reasons, but sufficient
buyers can be found only at very low, distorted prices.21 No one would
suggest that the price in such a market is informationally efficient other
than in the narrow context of a forced sale. In addition, the federal courts
are familiar with thinly traded securities markets that are almost certain-
ly relatively inefficient even with respect to the most inexpensive public
19 See Nobel Prize Committee Report, supra note 6, for an excellent summary of Shiller's
empirical studies, which range from comparing the long-term volatility of share prices and
dividends to developing simple models for predicting long-term returns on shareholdings.
Professor Shiller was awarded the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economic Science together with Eu-
gene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen. Id.
20 See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 23-25, 27-28.
21 Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J.
Econ. Persp. 29, 30 (2011).
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information. In fraud-on-the-market litigation, courts routinely rule on
the informational efficiency of markets in particular securities in deter-
mining whether to certify a plaintiffs' class.2 2 Not surprisingly, one of
the most important legal tests of efficiency is the extent to which the
market responds to new information that has obvious implications for a
security's value. A market may not respond to such information for the
simple reason that trades are few and the security is illiquid as a result.23
An implicit qualification of the ECMH is that one cannot expect infor-
mationally efficient prices without active trading. Finally, there is the is-
sue of primary markets. A security's issuing price precedes its active
trading price. It is active trading that aggregates information in price,
which is why a claim of price efficiency is weaker all else equal for
prices in initial public offerings than for prices in actively traded sec-
ondary markets. This point is particularly relevant in analyzing the im-
plications of the Subprime Crisis for the ECMH, as we demonstrate be-
low.
Stepping out of the roles of critic or defender of the ECMH, what
should we conclude thus far? First, that direct testing of fundamental ef-
ficiency is impossible in theory, but that if we lower our standard of ri-
gor it is possible to use proxy models of various sorts to assess whether
it is more or less likely that a market is fundamentally efficient. Second,
the informational efficiency of market prices can be tested more easily
and with more definitive results. Third, informational efficiency is a pre-
condition for fundamental efficiency, implying that informationally inef-
ficient prices cannot be fundamentally efficient. Our normative point,
addressed in Part IV, then follows: Making markets more informational-
22 See supra note 5 (explaining that the presumption of reliance necessary to certify a class
in a securities fraud case is conditional on a finding that the relevant market was informa-
tionally efficient).
23 The standard criteria used by courts to make the assessment of market efficiency in se-
curities class actions are: (1) the trading volume of the security; (2) the number of analysts
following the security; (3) the issuer's eligibility to file SEC Form S-3; (4) the presence of
market makers in the security; and (5) empirical evidence suggesting a causal connection
between new information and price movement. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 611-12 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp.
1264, 1284, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989)). From our perspective, this list combines a direct test of
a market's relative efficiency (whether the price moves in response to value-relevant new
information) and measures related to the mechanisms by which new information is incorpo-
rated into market price-the number of analysts, the characteristics necessary to use Form S-
3, and the number of market makers.
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ly efficient is also likely to nudge their prices in the direction of funda-
mental efficiency regardless of valuation models.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE ECMH AND THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVE
INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY
To better illustrate the relationship between market imperfections and
the informational efficiency of market prices, we begin with a capsule
account of the development of the ECMH. 24 As noted earlier, the as-
sumption of perfect markets underlies the major theoretical develop-
ments in financial economics between the late 1950s and the early
1970s, including CAPM 25 and the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propo-
sitions.26 The logic of these theories was compelling in a world of per-
fect markets-which included, of course, the assumption that market
prices reflected all relevant information. The theoretical power of per-
fectly informed prices easily led to the question whether prices in some
real markets might roughly approximate fully informed prices, at least
with respect to publicly available information. This conjecture was at the
core of an empirical ECMH as this was set out by the recent Nobelist
Eugene Fama in a seminal 1970 article reviewing the empirical literature
on the efficiency with which public equity prices reflected data from
three information sets-past price history, public information, and all in-
formation (including private information)-that define the now-famous
trichotomy of "weak," "semi-strong," and "strong" form informational
efficiency.27 Financial economists quickly accepted the semi-strong (or
public information) form of the ECMH, even to the point of suggesting
that it was almost tautological. Commenting on Fama's 1970 article, his
contemporary William Sharpe stated: "Simply put, the thesis is this: that
in a well-functioning securities market, the prices of [securities] will re-
flect predictions based on all relevant and available information. This
seems to be trivially self-evident to most professional economists-so
24 We have previously described the conduits through which information enters price in an
actively traded market as "the mechanisms of market efficiency." Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 9, at 565-67.
25 See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Fin. 489, 500-01,505 (1964).26 Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 266-67 (1958); Merton H. Miller &
Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411,
411-12 (1961).27 See Fama, supra note 18, at 383.
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much so, that testing seems rather silly. ' 28 Ten years later, William Bea-
ver made much the same point: "Why would one ever expect prices not
to 'fully reflect' publicly available information? Won't market efficien-
cy hold trivially? ' 29 Absent frictions, the arbitrage machine should logi-
cally ensure that price fully reflects available information.
Despite logic and evidence, however, the institutional question re-
mained: How could real markets seem to reflect public information in-
stantaneously? ° Why didn't market frictions drive a large wedge be-
tween the point at which public information was announced and the
point at which it seemed to be fully reflected in actual prices-at least in
actively traded public equity markets? Why didn't market frictions-
information costs--determine how rapidly most public information
seemed to be impounded in stock prices?
We explored this question at length in a 1984 article31 because it
seemed obvious to us that prices couldn't respond instantaneously to
new public information except in unusual cases. In real markets, infor-
mational efficiency was necessarily a relative concept. Depending on the
level of frictions, market prices would reflect different kinds of infor-
mation with greater or less "relative efficiency. 3 2 Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay echoed this conclusion twelve years later in a standard text
on the econometrics of finance: "The notion of relative efficien-
28 William F. Sharpe, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work:
Discussion, 25 J. Fin. 418, 418 (1970).
29 William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 Acct. Rev. 23, 32 (1981).
30 The extent to which CAPM, the Irrelevance Propositions, and the ECMH were original-
ly proffered as perfect market theorems with the goal of framing a research agenda that
would relax the perfect market assumptions to understand how real markets work and how
real institutions respond to market imperfections is an interesting question. Those who prof-
fered the theories later came to understand their work in that fashion. Assessing thirty years
of efforts to show which market imperfections falsify the Irrelevance Propositions, Merton
Miller acknowledged that "[1]ooking back now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis
on the other, upbeat side of the 'nothing matters' coin: showing what doesn't matter can also
show, by implication, what does." Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions
After Thirty Years, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 99, 100 (1988). Sharpe himself acknowledged in his
Nobel lecture that CAPM is compromised when there are institutional restrictions on short
selling. William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices With and Without Negative Holdings, 46 J.
Fin. 489, 489, 500-08 (1991). And one of the authors roughly framed the role of business
lawyers as that of transaction cost engineers, whose task was to craft a transaction structure
that allowed the parties to act as ifCAPM's perfect market assumptions were really true.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
Yale L.J. 239, 253-55 (1984).
31 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 565-67.
32 Id.
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cy... may be a more useful concept than the all-or-nothing view taken
by much of the traditional market-efficiency literature. 33
Our argument proceeded by expanding Fama's three categories of in-
formation into four mechanisms by which prices could impound infor-
mation and four categories of increasingly costly information.34 By the
early 1980s, a large body of empirical work demonstrated that stock
prices responded extremely rapidly to most public-and even "semi-
public"-information: In fact, they responded so rapidly that investors
could not make arbitrage profits by trading on this information. We con-
jectured that two market mechanisms explain the rapid response of pric-
es to such information: First, virtually all professional traders learn of
certain information nearly simultaneously, 35 making a (nearly) instanta-
neous price response inevitable; or, second, a much smaller-but still
sufficient-fraction of market professionals learn of new information
within a short time frame-say, minutes or hours-and rush to trade on
it before it is fully reflected in market prices. The second mechanism al-
so causes market prices to reflect new information very rapidly, alt-
hough not as rapidly as the first mechanism. Put differently, the second
mechanism, which we termed "professionally informed trading," is rela-
tively less efficient than the first. In highly liquid markets, such as those
in exchange-traded stocks, some degree of inefficiency must always re-
main in order to permit savvy investors to earn at least normal market
returns on average, and hence to incur the costs of analyzing and trading
on new public information at all. 36 But if the second mechanism is rela-
33 John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Finan-
cial Markets 24-25 (1997). The quotation continues:
The advantages of relative efficiency over absolute efficiency are easy to see by way
of an analogy. Physical systems are often given an efficiency rating based on the rela-
tive proportion of energy or fuel converted to useful work. Therefore, a piston engine
may be rated at 60% efficiency, meaning that on average 60% of the energy contained
in the engine's fuel is used to turn the crankshaft, with the remaining 40% lost to other
forms of work such as heat, light, or noise.
Few engineers would ever consider performing a statistical test to determine
whether or not a given engine is perfectly efficient-such an engine exists only in the
idealized frictionless world of the imagination. But measuring relative efficiency-
relative to the frictionless ideal-is commonplace.
Id.
34 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 592-93.
35 Consider, for example, an announcement by the Federal Reserve of a major change in its
quantitative easing policy.
36 As pointed out by Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, professional traders must earn
a normal return to incur the transaction costs of trading on new information. Sanford J.
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tively less efficient than the first, it is still efficient enough to allow pric-
es to reflect much information that is understood and acted on by rela-
tively small numbers of traders almost as rapidly as information that the
entire market learns at once.a7
Other mechanisms for incorporating other kinds of information in
price are much less efficient. For example, private information known
only to insiders is likely to enter the market gradually, after insiders
begin to trade on it and savvy outsiders subsequently deduce its content
by observing insider trades or decoding unexpected movements in the
market. In the public equity markets, the classic example is undisclosed
corporate inside information that enters market prices only after manag-
ers trade on it or leak it to a handful of outsiders. Finally, a fourth re-
markable, if relatively inefficient, market mechanism serves to channel
noisy information into price even though no one knows this information
for certain: This is the ability of market prices (in the right circumstanc-
es) to aggregate the independent forecasts of many traders with hetero-
geneous information, and thereby reflect in market price a collective
forecast that is better informed than the forecast of any individual trad-
er.38 As a partial illustration, consider instances in which stock prices
remain unaffected by the announcement of an economically significant
change in the Federal Reserve's monetary policy because the change is
said to have been correctly forecast by the market well before it was an-
Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,
70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 404-05 (1980). It follows that prices can never be completely effi-
cient vis-A-vis public information that is not universally known; there must always be some
informational inefficiency to motivate arbitrage.
37 Note that we did not-and do not-assume that these savvy traders know the precise
weight that the market's implicit asset pricing model will assign information, whether it is
semi-public, private, or unknown as of yet. In most circumstances, good traders will have a
contextual understanding of the market's pricing model. For example, if newly released fi-
nancial information leads expert analysts to question the "quality" of a firm's earnings (and
therefore its future prospects), these analysts know that the firm's share price will fall rela-
tive to its price a moment before the information was released. They are also likely to have a
rough idea of how far it will fall most of the time. In times of economic crisis, however,
traders will have much less situational knowledge of the market's pricing model and so vola-
tility-the number of pieces of new information with implications for the stock's price-will
increase accordingly. See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 23-25, 27-28.
38 We term this last mechanism "uninformed trading." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9,
at 579-80. It is the least efficient of the four market mechanisms, precisely because the true
content of information is unknown and, as a result, price "averages" the partial information
and opinion of all investors democratically. Id. We term the other three mechanisms, respec-
tively, "universally informed trading," "professionally informed trading," and "derivatively
informed trading." Id. at 566.
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nounced; that is, it was "priced into" market prices prior to its an-
nouncement.
Note, however, that all of the preceding mechanisms for introducing
information into price depend on the costs of information and the costs
of arbitrage-that is, the costs of trading on information. Our previous
articles have focused principally on determinants of these two categories
of cost in the relatively well-functioning and continuous markets for
public equities.39 For example, in our 1984 article, we argued that infor-
mation costs determine how widely particular information is distributed
in a market, and therefore the relative efficiency of the market mecha-
nism that incorporates it into price.40 Much of our discussion there fo-
cused on the market frictions that contribute to information cost and the
market institutions and regulatory interventions that have responded to
these frictions. We continue to stress the costs of acquiring information
in our reprise of the Subprime Crisis below; indeed, some information
was not available at any feasible price. However, our account gives
equal weight to the costs of trading on acquired information in order to
introduce it into price. As we argue below, in the various markets asso-
ciated with RMBSs, frictions introduced by the market structure itself
often made the mechanism by which information comes to be incorpo-
rated into price much more salient than it is in the public equities mar-
kets. We now turn in Part III to an account of the determinants of infor-
mational efficiency of prices in the several Crisis-related securities
markets.4 1 As we will see, the magnitude of these costs figured centrally
39 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715
(2003) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Hindsight].
40 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 592.
41 It is helpful to distinguish here between two common uses of the term "informational
efficiency"-and among several meanings of "market"-that are sometimes conflated. As
noted above, informational efficiency in the context of the ECMH refers to the speed with
which particular information is fully reflected in the price of a given security. As we note in
the text, however, the rapid reflection of information into price is a function of the trading
market as well as the availability of the information. This implies that prices may be relative-
ly very efficient with respect to available information, but also relatively "uninformed" in the
sense that much value-relevant information about a security may not be available. Or, put
differently, securities prices that are relatively very efficient in reflecting information are not
necessarily deeply informed. The converse is not true, however. A thin trading market-say,
an over-the-counter market in which a trade occurs once a week-may be very slow in re-
flecting even low-cost public information. The particular market mechanisms that reflect in-
formation in price in a securities market depend on the distribution-and hence the cost--of
the information. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9 and accompanying text; id. at 592-
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in the Subprime Crisis. And as we will argue in Part IV, the ECMH,
properly understood, focuses our attention on reducing these costs.
III. THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY
Assessing the ECMH in light of the Subprime Crisis must begin by
noting that at least three markets in securities and their associated deriv-
atives are implicated in the Crisis: the markets in RMBSs, in CDOs
(bonds tied largely to the returns on RMBSs), and in the stocks of finan-
cial institutions that were themselves active in the RMBS-CDO market
as originators, securitizers, underwriters, insurers, or investors in the
markets for mortgage-backed securities. Evaluating a modest ECMH, as
we have defined it, requires some discussion of each of these. In each
market the inquiry must be whether prices in one or more classes of se-
curities responded rapidly (that is, with relative efficiency) to the public
release of new, value-relevant information-at least when the ECMH
would lead us to expect a relatively efficient price response to the new
information. Conversely, do market frictions-high information costs
and severe constraints on effective arbitrage-lead us to expect a high
degree of market inefficiency, implying that the ECMH is a useful tool
for understanding and possibly improving the informational quality of
market prices?
ECMH critics might argue that market prices failed to reflect various
kinds of information efficiently (or at all) prior to the Crisis, some of
93. But in the absence of active trading and visible prices, even the cheapest information
may fail to be fully reflected in price.
The second point concerning the use of the term "market" also requires clarification.
There is, on one level, a single secondary market in public equities in America ("The Mar-
ket"), insofar as a relatively well-defined list of stocks is subject to the same disclosure re-
quirements, the same regulator, the same liability rules, etc. On another institutional level,
there are multiple markets with different institutional underpinnings; for example, issuers
whose shares trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, in "blind pools," over-the-counter, etc-and
are subject to commensurately more or less exacting scrutiny by auditors, investors, regula-
tors, analysts, and the press according to their market capitalization and other factors. For
purposes of addressing relative market efficiency, however, the relevant market is still more
specific: It is the market in the particular security under consideration, a market that is nested
in the broader institutional context of The Market (that is, the institutional and legal struc-
tures that govern trading in all public equities). Thus, to ask whether the American market in
publicly traded equities is relatively efficient is ambiguous. A much more meaningful ques-
tion is whether market prices for specific equities subject to a threshold level of trading vol-
ume and a certain level of scrutiny by auditors, analysts, regulators, and the investing public
are likely to be semi-strong form efficient. The federal courts must ask just this question in
assessing the merits of fraud-on-the-market litigation. See supra note 5.
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which were specific to the markets in particular securities. Yet infor-
mation about the likely future behavior of the housing market and the
default risks associated with subprime and alt-prime mortgages was
clearly relevant in all of the securities markets associated with the Crisis.
To reprise the familiar, the residential housing market-not a securities
market-was the foundation on which prices in all of the Crisis-related
securities markets depended. We concur with the now widely accepted
view that the housing market experienced an enormous bubble begin-
ning in 2001, if not earlier, and ending in the fourth quarter of 2007,
when housing generally collapsed.4 2 The source of this bubble was mac-
roeconomic but it was exacerbated by the markets in mortgage-backed
securities. A substantial increase in global liquidity reduced the price of
credit, which in turn increased the demand-and hence the price-of
homes. In addition, new mortgage products that required little or no
down payment further expanded the availability of credit, and thus also
increased demand for housing with a similar effect on housing prices. In
particular, mortgage products with low introductory interest rates en-
couraged home sales even when buyers might have been unable to ser-
vice their mortgages after their initially low "teaser" interest rates ended
two or three years out. This increased the number of potential homebuy-
ers relative to the much lower rate of growth in housing stock, and thus
also increased housing prices, at least for the short run.43
Thus one critical "bit" of information may be "public" in the sense of
being cheap to acquire: namely, knowledge of the existence of a housing
bubble and its corollary, the knowledge that sooner or later residential
42 On this point we differ from Eugene Fama, the most prominent advocate of ECMH. See John
Cassidy, Interview with Eugene Fama, New Yorker (Jan. 13, 2010), www.newyorker.com/
online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html. Fama conjectures that
housing prices fell victim to an incipient worldwide recession that was unforeseen by almost
all sophisticated financial actors. Id. In our view, however, whether one believes that a bub-
ble in the housing market and its associated financial assets triggered the crisis, or, as Fama
believes, that developments in the real economy triggered a fall in real estate prices and the
Subprime Crisis, does not bear importantly on the modest conception of the ECMH that we
discuss in this Article or the policy implications that follow from it.
43 By housing bubble we only mean that housing was costly relative to historical prices.
Was housing also costly relative to its "fundamental value"? In light of what level of liquidi-
ty and over what range of mortgage products should fundamental value be measured? The
condition of the housing market and the mortgage financing that fueled it are critical to as-
sessing the implications of the Subprime Crisis for the ECMH, but the housing market itself
is not a trading market in which the informational efficiency of prices can be easily evaluat-
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real estate prices were likely to fall-and perhaps even fall dramatically.
It seems plausible that many savvy investors in the mortgage-backed se-
curities had this knowledge. As early as 2003, Robert Shiller provided
strong evidence of a housing market bubble. Moreover, a close student
of the Crisis, the economist Gary Gorton, has asserted that, contrary to
the popular accounts, investors generally believed that real estate prices
had entered a bubble phase at least two years before the crash occurred.
Nevertheless, this knowledge alone was not enough to induce them to
take the risky step of shorting mortgage-backed securities markets (to
the extent that this was possible). The investors who did take this step
and profited as a result were not visionaries; rather, they were lucky in
their timing, since "[m]any saw the coming crisis. This was the subject
of intense debate starting in 2005.""
Assume, then, that many professional investors recognized a bubble
in housing prices and forecast a sharp decline or even a crisis in the
housing market by the start of 2005. There were still two other critical
bits of information missing: a useful forecast of when the bubble was
likely to burst and knowledge of the consequence of a sharp drop in
housing prices for each of the relevant securities. We argue below that
this information was likely to have been much more difficult-that is,
costly-for investors to obtain than a general sense that the housing
market was overpriced. Additionally, we argue that insight into the tim-
ing of the crash and its likely consequences might not have reached pric-
es in the mortgage-backed securities markets even if it were "known" to
a minority of traders. We proceed below to examine each of the relevant
securities markets.
A. The RMBS Market
Most residential mortgages (aside from non-conforming jumbo mort-
gages) were bundled into pools and sold to passive "special purpose ve-
hicles" for purposes of securitization. These entities purchased mortgag-
es with funds raised by selling fixed-income securities to investors-
tranched bonds backed by the cash flows of the mortgage pools. Bonds
backed by the most senior tranche. of RMBSs generally received an
44 Gary Gorton, Book Review, 49 J. Econ. Literature 450, 451 (2011).
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AAA rating by at least two of the three major rating agencies.45 Subor-
dinated bonds were rated AA, A, and so forth down to BBB-, the lowest
investment-grade rating below which there was only a thin level of un-
rated "equity." Senior RMBS bonds were liquid and traded frequently
until the Crisis was in full bloom during the last months of 2007, even
when they were issued by exclusively subprime mortgage pools. Bonds
backed by lower tranches of a mortgage pool-for example, the BBB or
BBB- bonds-were less liquid.
The RMBSs, in turn, spawned two derivative markets. The first was
the over-the-counter ("OTC") market in credit default swaps ("CDSs")
written on RMBS bonds, which were initially introduced to large inves-
tors in January 2005 .46 CDS contracts on bonds are a form of default in-
surance that requires the buyer to pay a percentage of the face value of a
bond or other credit obligation in exchange for the seller's promise to
reimburse the face value of the debt (minus its residual market value)
should the debt default. Over-the-counter CDS contracts became the first
cost-efficient way to short RMBS-backed bonds.4 7
The second derivative to emerge from the RMBS market extended
only to bonds backed by subprime mortgage pools. 48 This was the trad-
ing platform in so-called "ABX" indices that were introduced by Markit,
a UK corporation, in January 2006. Markit referenced its subprime indi-
ces to the market prices of bonds issued by the twenty largest RMBS of-
ferings within a discrete six-month period, beginning with subprime
RMBS bonds issued during the second half of 2005. These ABX indices
reflected an unweighted average of the prices of the rated bonds issued
against each tranche of RMBS mortgage pools. In effect, the ABX mar-
ket offered a vehicle for investors to go long or short in any rated
45 The three major rating agencies are Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, and
Fitch. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly,
1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 231, 248 (2011) (discussing rating agencies and the Subprime Crisis).46 John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle 111
(Yale Univ. Cowles Found. for Research in Econ., Paper No. 1305, 2010), available at
http://dido.wss.yale.edu/P/cp/pl3a/pl305.pdf, accord Luigi Zingales, Credit Default Swaps
on Trial, Project Syndicate (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
credit-default-swaps-on-trial. A standardized CDS contract for RMBS bonds was later intro-
duced by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association in June 2005. See Michael
Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine 49 (2010).
47 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 11.
48 Subprime mortgages are those mortgages offered to borrowers with poor credit histories
and they are characterized by their high interest rates, relatively unfavorable terms, and low-
quality collateral.
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tranche of the subprime RMBS market. Soon after the ABX market
opened, volume ballooned-much of it initiated by investors shorting
subprime bonds. Much of this shorting may have been by large banks
and other institutions seeking to set off the risk they bore on large stocks
of subprime RMBSs, which they held either on their own accounts or as
"warehoused" bonds for later use in the construction of third-level mort-
gage-backed securities discussed below.49 Doubtless, investors seeking
naked bets against subprime mortgage markets accounted for additional
shorting activity. At the outset of trading on ABX indices in January
2006, subprime mortgages comprised roughly a quarter of the entire
mortgage-backed securities market.5 °
Prices in the ABX market provided low-cost information on how in-
vestors as a whole evaluated the quality of these securities-information
that had hitherto been unavailable. The effect was transformational. In
the words of Gary Gorton: "With the advent of the ABX indices, market
participants could, for the first time, express views about the value of
subprime bonds, by buying or selling protection. For the first time in-
formation about subprime values and risks was aggregated and re-
vealed."51
Since highly rated RMBSs were relatively liquid in the OTC market
and subprime indices were actively traded on an exchange, pricing in
both markets clearly responded to new information. Indeed, price
movements in ABX indices during the Crisis predicted price movements
in broader markets by as much as three weeks--either by informing
these large markets or by causing them to react. 2 To be sure, heavy
49 The history and structure of the ABX securities indices are canvassed in Nancy Wallace,
The Bear's Lair: Index Credit Default Swaps and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Feb. 2,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1787848.
50 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 27.
51 Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007, at 4 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14649, 2009) [hereinafter Gorton, Information],
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4649; see Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic 23
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14398, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4398 (arguing that ABX indices solved the RMBS market's
common knowledge problem). Contemporaneous market professionals made the same point
well before Gordon did. See, e.g., Kevin Kendra, Tranche ABX and Basis Risk in Subprime
RMBS Structured Portfolios, Derivative Fitch 47 (Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.fitchratings.com/webcontent/sectors/subprime/Basisin ABXTABXBespoke.
SFCDOs.ppt ("The ABX.HE has proven to be effective in providing market transparency in
an otherwise opaque market.").
52 See Francis A. Longstaff, The Subprime Credit Crisis and Contagion in Financial Mar-
kets, 97 J. Fin. Econ. 436, 437 (2010); James R. Hagerty & Serena Ng, Does Subprime In-
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shorting of the ABX indices lowered their implicit returns below those
of the cash securities underlying the indices in late 2006. For example,
for months the market priced the ABX BBB index at thirty basis points
below the return on the cash subprime BBB bonds that the ABX BBB
tranche indexed. This may have been an instance of inefficiency in these
markets; the returns on the BBB index and the referenced BBB cash as-
sets should have been identical or nearly so." If so, however, it was an
inefficiency that was heavily arbitraged. Equally important, the extent to
which enormous demand for protection against a decline in the housing
market pushed down the prices of the ABX seems in retrospect to be a
hint of the Crisis yet to come in late 2007. 54
Given that the secondary markets in RMBS subprime ABX indices
were reasonable candidates for reflecting public or semi-public infor-
mation in prices, the issue is whether they did so. What information-
assuming it was widely known-failed to enter prices at this intermedi-
ate level?
Consider first the declining quality of the mortgages that flowed into
subprime mortgage pools. At least prior to 2006, it seems that prices of
bonds issued against subprime mortgage pools failed to reflect the pro-
gressive deterioration of the quality of subprime mortgages. Some com-
mentators assert that this decline in mortgage quality was clearly evident
as early as late 2005. 55 Would the failure of prices to reflect this infor-
mation imply price inefficiency? Recall that the market in ABX indices
was introduced in January 2006. Before this, RMBS price information in
the OTC market was qualified and incomplete. Perhaps the timing of the
introduction of the ABX indices was not accidental. In any event, the
new ABX market faced strong and immediate shorting of subprime
bonds, driven in no small part by the demand for insurance by those
holding the securities. In addition, increasing housing prices would have
dex Amplify Risk?, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB 117253842321420060 (quoting a CreditSight analyst commenting that "the ABX is accu-
rately reflecting the panic being felt by some of the big mortgage players").
53 See Gorton, Information, supra note 51, at 7 fig.2.
54 For further evidence that the demand for these securities as insurance drove down the
price of the index such that it no longer served as an accurate measure of the default risk as-
sociated with the securities, see Wallace, supra note 49, at 44. In effect, the price overstated
the likelihood of default because the security price was driven by demand for the insurance
function rather than expected future defaults.
55 Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1848, 1866 (2012).
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disguised the declining quality of subprime mortgages as long as in-
creases in home prices continued. Even the worst "liar loan" retained its
value if it paid interest and was easily refinanced. Thus, information
about the deteriorating quality of subprime mortgages may have been a
secondary consideration to market traders.
And what of the alleged failure of the broader RMBS market to antic-
ipate the decline in home prices? Here we plead no contest. As indicated
above, many investors suspected a housing bubble and yet remained
deeply uncertain about the timing and extent of its correction. Housing
prices had risen almost continuously for three decades prior to the Sub-
prime Crisis.5 6 Moreover, there was a twist in the mortgage-backed secu-
rities markets. The consequences of increasing default rates differed sig-
nificantly by rating in the RMBS market-most AAA RMBS bonds
retained their value throughout the Subprime Crisis. By contrast, the po-
sitions of holders of AAA bonds in mezzanine CDO bonds-considered
56 See, e.g., Gary Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them
Coming 221 (2012); Wallace, supra note 49, at 29-30. Among other evidence indicating that
market professionals did not anticipate a break in housing prices during the 2004-2006 peri-
od are data indicating that a large sample of mid-level executives in securitized financing
personally invested in real estate as aggressively-if not more aggressively-than compara-
bly situated control groups. Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Wall Street and the Housing Bubble 3-4
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18904, 2014), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2232233. There is, of course, apparently contradictory evidence that
some investment bankers underwriting CDOs knew perfectly well that the subprime RMBSs
they placed in their CDO asset portfolios were of particularly low quality and likely to de-
fault within a timespan brief enough to profit from shorting their own CDOs. See, e.g., Jesse
Eisinger, Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Bad Behavior at Morgan Stanley, N.Y. Times
DealBook (Jan. 23, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/financial-
crisis-lawsuit-suggests-bad-behavir-at-mrgan-staney/?-php--true&-type=blogs&-r-
(reporting that bankers jokingly named the CDOs created and sold to Chinese and Taiwanese
banks in the first half of 2006 "Subprime Meltdown," "Hitman," and "Nuclear Holocaust"
before shorting their own creation). Assuming the worst, however, this evidence does not
necessarily bear on what these banks assumed to be the case about the RMBS market in gen-
eral since it appears that they cherry-picked the market for especially default-prone RMBS
mortgage pools. Similarly, there is evidence that investors who invested heavily in private
information were able to profit handsomely from long positions in RMBSs through the Cri-
sis and afterwards. See BlackRock Solutions Fin. Mkts. Advisory Grp., Financial Markets Ad-
visory: Residential Mortgages (2010), available at https://www.blackrock.com/institutions/en-
us/literature/investor-education/blk-insti-fma-residential-mortgages.pdf (touting the perfor-
mance of RMBS investments informed by proprietary zip code-level, continuously-updated
mortgage data, and proprietary valuation models). Again, however, earning strong positive
returns on long positions in RMBSs-including RMBSs backed by subprime mortgages-
required costly information and cherry-picking for particularly low-risk mortgage pools that
were mispriced by a less well-informed market.
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below-were initially more opaque and ultimately far less favorable
than those of the holders of AAA RMBS bonds.
In addition, a third sort of relevant pricing information is endogenous
to hierarchically layered markets. Continued institutional demand for
AAA bonds in the top-tier CDO market had raised the value of the as-
sets in the markets below. Securitizers of mortgage pools depended on
CDOs to place their riskier securities, and the demand for mezzanine
CDO AAA securities in turn stimulated originators to generate more
mortgages, which, as noted before, further inflated housing prices. Nev-
ertheless, housing purchases were the prime movers in the cycle. Chang-
es in home prices registered virtually instantaneously in the movement
of ABX indices, while institutional purchasers of AAA CDO bonds
were much slower to react to declining housing prices.
B. The Market for CDOs and Associated Derivatives
The second mortgage-backed bond market central to the Subprime
Crisis was the market for CDO bonds. This market was at the top of the
market hierarchy in mortgage-backed securities in much the same sense
that the housing market was at the bottom. Like RMBS entities, CDOs
were special purpose vehicles that issued bonds backed by the returns on
variously rated tranches of their underlying asset pools. Most mortgage-
linked CDO assets were mid- and lower-tranche RMBS holdings, alt-
hough higher-tranche RMBS bonds, and even securitized credit card and
corporate debt, also might have been included in the mix. Unlike the
pools of securitized mortgages, however, CDO asset portfolios were ac-
tively managed; that is, as bonds in these portfolios matured, CDO
"managers" selected new assets as replacements-again, usually the
BBB or "mezzanine" tranches of RMBS bonds. CDO managers also
conventionally selected the inventory in a CDO's initial portfolio and
earned embedded fees that were senior to any distributions to CDO
bondholders. For example, a CDO-call it "IBEX"-might purchase all
of one subprime RMBS BBB bonds, half of RMBS A- bonds, and so on,
until IBEX had an asset pool that included various tranche-backed bonds
of 100 RMBS. IBEX would then divide its cash flows into as many as
thirteen rated tranches, each of which would then collateralize classes of
bonds for purchase by institutional investors.
The value of a typical CDO's asset portfolio was enormous in com-
parison to the value of the individual securitized mortgage pools: One or
two billion-dollar CDO entities were the norm. CDOs that relied primar-
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ily on RMBS assets emerged on a large scale in 2005, peaked in 2006,
and dwindled to almost nothing by the first quarter of 2008.57 Some
commentators generally agree that a principal reason for the rise in
CDOs during 2005 and 2006 was an effort by underwriters to create
buyers for otherwise illiquid mezzanine RMBS tranches.58 Adam Levitin
and Susan Wachter argue that the 2005-2006 explosion in CDO issues
extended the Subprime Crisis by creating demand for mezzanine RMBS
securities (for example, BBB- bonds) that would otherwise have choked
the securitization "pipeline,"59 that is, the originators, securitization spe-
cialists, CDO sponsors, and CDO underwriters that created and distrib-
uted products to meet strong investor demand for AAA and AAA+
bonds. By 2005, fifty percent of higher quality senior CDO bonds and
seventy-seven percent of senior mezzanine CDO bonds were collateral-
ized by subprime mortgages assets.60
The rating agencies routinely awarded the coveted AAA rating to
bonds backed by the top tranches of CDOs even though the cash flows
of these CDOs derived largely from riskier BBB tranches of RMBS
mortgage pools-and often from those of subprime BBB tranches at
that. Whether this was-or was not-paradoxical was a matter of per-
spective at the time. If, after all, ten percent of all RMBS mortgage pools
were to default on all of their bonds (from equity to AAA)-a worst
case scenario in 2005-the remaining ninety percent of the BBB cash
flows would suffice to cover a CDO's line of AAA-rated bonds. The
risk profile of the typical mezzanine CDO allocated sixty-two percent of
its net cash flows to senior AAA bonds, fourteen percent to junior AAA
bonds, and eight percent to AA bonds. A ten percent default rate in the
underlying subprime collateral would still permit these three (senior
AAA to AA) bonds to be paid in full while the remaining A through
BBB- bonds and a thin layer of unrated "equity" took the hit.6" In addi-
tion, CDO issuers typically fortified their senior (or "super safe") AAA
bonds with risk-limiting devices, such as placing some conspicuously
low-risk assets in their asset portfolios or over-collateralizing top-
tranche bonds by shifting risk to lower tranches.
57 See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 10, 26 tbl.5 (2009).
58 See id. at 18.
59 See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 Geo.
L.J. 1177, 1237-42 (2012).
60 Gorton, supra note 57, at 27 tbl.5.
61 See id. at 24 fig.3.
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Alas, however, a different outcome would follow if no RMBS entity
defaulted on all of its bonds but numerous entities defaulted on bonds of
BBB seniority and below. As proved to be the case, this would happen if
cash flows across RMBSs were highly correlated. And its consequence
would be that mezzanine CDOs that issued bonds against asset pools
that included many BBB RMBS bonds might be forced to default on
even their most senior AAA bonds.
By and large, the underwriters of CDOs were the large investment
and commercial banks. CDOs were usually issued directly to their ulti-
mate purchasers who, in the case of AAA-rated bonds, were generally
institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds,
hedge funds, or German Landesbanken. These CDOs were bespoke and
illiquid. For the most part, they were acquired as long-term portfolio as-
sets.62 Indeed, most institutional investors would only purchase CDO
bonds at an initial distribution-that is, in the "primary market"--
thereby eliminating the possibility of a secondary market. The literature
speculates that institutional investors avoided purchasing on a secondary
market for fear that they would become victims of adverse selection,
since the only sellers would be more knowledgeable owners who be-
lieved the securities were overpriced.63 It seemed safer to purchase on
the primary market when many other institutions were purchasing simul-
taneously and where the seller was a repeat player.64 There is little evi-
dence to suggest that the lower-rated tranches of bespoke CDOs were
more liquid than the senior tranches, and the analogy of low-rated
RMBS bonds suggests that they were most likely even less liquid, were
it not for the fact that AAA CDOs were themselves illiquid.
Why did institutional investors of all sorts purchase AAA-rated bonds
backed by mezzanine CDO entities? Perhaps the best answer is that the
institutional buyers understood these bonds to be safe-to have the same
risk characteristics as AAA corporate bonds, for example. Andrew Lo
quotes a 2006 story in the Financial Times in which the European head
of structured products at Fortis Investments was asked to explain the
62 See Martin Scheicher, How Has CDO Market Pricing Changed During the Turmoil?
Evidence From CDS Index Tranches 5 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 910, 2008),
available at http://ssm.com/abstractid= 1147094.
63 See Guillaume Plantin, Learning by Holding and Liquidity, 76 Rev. Econ. Stud. 395,
395 (2009).
64 Id.
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enormous growth in CDO bond issues during 2005.65 The explanation he
offered was simple: "You buy a AA-rated corporate bond you get paid
Libor plus 20 basis points; you buy a AA-rated CDO and you get Libor
plus 110 basis points. ' 66 As Lo notes with some irony, no hidebound be-
liever in the ECMH would have made such an assumption. 67 The takea-
way is that the majority of the managers of the institutional buyers of
CDOs either believed rating-agency evaluations of risk and trusted the
storied reputations of underwriters such as Goldman Sachs or, alterna-
tively, they knew that they would not be penalized for acting as if they
believed this to be so. Thus, purchasing a super-safe tranche of an asset-
back security ("ABS") CDO was a no-brainer-more yield, lower risk,
and no blame. Institutional buyers did not attempt to independently val-
ue the securities they purchased. Doing so would have required capabili-
ties that few of them possessed. Like a handful of other asset classes
such as federal reserve notes, AAA CDO bonds were considered to be
extraordinarily safe, safer even than similarly rated corporate bonds. In
the post-Crisis vocabulary, these bonds were considered so safe that they
were "information-insensitive"--meaning that they were near substitutes
for treasury bills and cash, (almost) without risk, and therefore accepta-
ble as efficient collateral in financial transactions.68 They were routinely
used as such in the short-term money market and were treated favorably
as bank capital by the Basel II Accord.69 In fact, demand for super safe
AAA CDO bonds seems to have exceeded supply, a market condition
that Gary Gorton conjectures led to a parallel explosion of "synthetic"
CDOs in 2005 and 2006.70
65 Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J.
Econ. Literature 151, 152 n.4 (2012).66 Id.
67 See id. at 152.
68 See Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, The Safe-Asset Share 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17777, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17777.
9 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Meas-
urement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 104, 107 (2006), available at
htt://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl 28.pdf.
Gorton, supra note 57, at 28-29. Exposure to BBB-rated subprime RMBSs was 160% of
issues comprised of cash securities in 2005, and 193% in 2006. Id. This is roughly equivalent
to saying that, by dollar value, 37.5% of mezzanine CDOs issued in 2005 and 48.2% of those
issued in 2006 were synthetic CDOs. Overall, about 25% of all CDOs issued between 2004
and 2007 were synthetic. Id.
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Inevitably, the introduction of CDOs into the mortgage-backed secu-
rities market led to the introduction of CDS protection of CDOs-and in
the case of synthetic CDOs, CDSs and CDOs were born simultaneously.
Both derivative securities referenced the same large set of underlying
mortgage pools and shifted cash flows to one another as ifCDOs had ac-
tually purchased the referenced cash assets. But standard CDS contracts
and indices, while they existed,71 played a much smaller role in the CDO
market than they did in the RMBS market. Apart from the fact that the
Crisis left the CDO market little time to evolve, the likely reasons were
that CDOs were enormously more complex, difficult to value, and illiq-
uid than were pools of RMBS bonds.7 2 Bespoke CDS protection on in-
dividual CDO tranches of bonds was written either by the CDO manag-
ers themselves or by a few large institutions, such as AIG, Lehman
Brothers, and monoline insurers. And it was famously purchased by a
small number of investors who wished to short the market, as well as by
larger numbers of banks that retained AAA CDO bonds and wished to
limit their exposure to asset-backed security risk.73
The widespread perception prior to mid-2007 that AAA CDOs were
"super safe" was of course incorrect, at least for mezzanine CDOs.
Should we have expected the CDO market to have discovered this fact
on its own before the Crisis? The short answer is no. As a primary mar-
ket with very little active trading, the CDO market was simply not struc-
tured in a way that facilitated arbitrage before the Crisis struck.
Did institutional purchasers evidence naivet6 or cognitive bias by ac-
cepting the prices that underwriters offered without seeking independent
valuations? Ex post one can see warning signs that might have led to
greater caution. By mid-2005, the Bank for International Settlements
had already warned of potential problems in underwriter valuation mod-
els-especially of the danger of high correlations among portfolio as-
71 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 46, at 130. Note that the standardized CDS contract on
CDOs entered the market almost exactly one year after the standard CDS contract on
RMBSs. See Gorton, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
72 For an excellent account of the complexity of structured instruments in the mortgage-
backed securities market, see Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 657 (2012). For an argument
based on experimental evidence that complexity increases price volatility, lowers liquidity,
and reduces trading efficiency, see Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Trading Complex Assets, 68 J.
Fin. 1937, 1937-38 (2013). The authors observe that complexity reduces the asset prices, not
merely by increasing information costs to traders, but also by altering bidding strategies and
making investors less likely to trade. Id. at 1938-39.
73 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 77; Wallace, supra note 49, at 2-3.
342 [Vol. 100:313
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis
sets-and against putting too much faith in the rating agencies. 74 It
seems more plausible, however, that institutional investors rationally re-
lied on the reputations and models of the rating agencies and the major
banks that served as underwriters. Asset-backed CDOs had performed
well in years immediately preceding the Crisis, and AAA-rated bonds,
even from mezzanine subprime CDOs, were widely accepted in the
market as virtually riskless securities. Indeed, they were better than
that-these were AAA-rated bonds that paid a premium return relative
to other securities thought to be super safe.7 5
Did the underwriters of subprime AAA CDOs-and the agencies that
rated these bonds-deliberately mislead their institutional buyers about
the risk involved? Certainly there is evidence that rating agencies gradu-
ally relaxed their standards for rating these securities from 2004 to 2006.
And there is evidence that the quality of subprime CDOs declined as
well, both in the quality of individual subprime mortgages and in the
percentages of subprime mortgages in CDO portfolios. Moreover, un-
derwriters often withheld information from the purchasers of CDO-
backed bonds that might have been considered material-the most infa-
mous example being the case of the ABACUS CDO, in which a hedge
fund helped to select the reference RMBSs for a synthetic CDO that
Goldman Sachs underwrote, and then promptly shorted the CDO once
its bonds had been placed.76 On the other hand, there is also evidence of
rating agencies and CDO underwriters acting in good faith. Many large
banks added a portion of the super-safe tier of the CDO bonds that they
underwrote to their core capital, a decision that cost them dearly during
the Subprime Crisis. The valuation models employed by the banks and
the rating agencies failed for reasons that are obvious in retrospect but
74 See, e.g., Bank for Int'l Settlements, The Joint Forum: Credit Risk Transfer 24-29
(2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/jointl3.htm. A subsequent revision of this re-
port, published in 2008, demonstrates the validity of the concerns raised in 2005. See Bank
for Int'l Settlements, The Joint Forum: Credit Risk Transfer 1-2 (2008), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint21 .htm.
5 In addition, of course, the managers of institutional buyers enjoyed the benefits of ra-
tional herding. But this is rational behavior as well, at least from the standpoint of the indi-
vidual manager-agent. See Claire A. Hill, Why Didn't Subprime Investors Demand a (Much
Larger) Lemons Premium?, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 47, 49-50, 59 (2011).
7 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud
in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm; see also Jesse Eisinger, supra note
56, at 3-6 (describing evidence that Morgan Stanley, among other banks, also shorts its own
CDOs).
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were not obvious at the time, such as the use of historical housing price
data to estimate the future performance of CDO portfolios. But whatever
their intentions, there is no question that banks and rating agencies per-
formed poorly as informational intermediaries, with the effect of juicing
the institutional investor market for senior subprime CDO securities.
There were massive frictions and informational asymmetries in the mar-
ket for these securities. The question is: What do these imperfections
imply for the ECMH?
The answer is "not much" for a modestly sized ECMH. Again, senior
subprime-backed CDO bonds were issued in a primary market and were
not traded in a secondary market. As Gorton stresses, "over-the-counter
markets seem to aggregate information very differently than.., stock
markets."" The claim that market prices are informationally efficient re-
quires astute traders to seek profit by trading on new information. The
assumption of active trading underlies all of the efficiency mechanisms
that aggregate information into price. A primary market without an af-
termarket simply lacks the structure to converge on efficient prices.
C. The Stock Market and Publicly Traded Financial Institutions
The last market one might have expected to play an important role in
the Subprime Crisis was the stock market. After all, most underwriters
of CDOs were publicly traded banks, the largest independent originators
and securitizers of mortgages-such as Countrywide Financial Corpora-
tion-were publicly traded, and the few large financial institutions that
sold CDS insurance on CDO bonds-such as AIG, Lehman Brothers
and the monoline insurer Ambac Financial Group-were also publicly
traded. In general, however, the stock market appears to have been a
latecomer rather than a leader in recognizing signs of the onset of the
Subprime Crisis. Why did share prices not reflect deterioration in the
quality of CDO securities, agency ratings, and quality of mortgages well
before the Subprime Crisis was in full throat?
Once again, the most plausible answer is that obtaining and interpret-
ing information about prices was not easy for traders in the equities
markets.7 8 To begin, the senior tranches of bespoke CDOs-together
77 Gorton, supra note 56, at 207.
78 See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case
Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. Corp. L. 1 (2010) (exam-
ining the effects of enhanced derivative disclosures); Hill, supra note 75. Bartlett finds evi-
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with CDS protection on the other side of the bet-were extremely diffi-
cult to value. In addition, the business activities of giant banks and fi-
nancial institutions such as AIG are diverse, and financial statements do
not necessarily segregate their activities. Further, CDO bonds were un-
likely to be "marked to market" given their lack of liquidity and were
sometimes carried off the books entirely.7 9 To be sure, some evidence of
uneasiness was reflected in the behavior of some big banks. Morgan
Stanley, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and eventually Goldman Sachs
were worried enough to wind down their CDO operations and short or
hedge the CDOs that remained in their warehouses in 2005 and in the
dence inconsistent with the ECMH in a case study of the share price movements of the Am-
bac Financial Group (Ambac), a widely held monoline insurance company with heavy expo-
sure to twenty-eight CDOs. While Bartlett's study is not easily summarized, its principal
findings include the observations that Ambac share prices exhibited proportionately negative
abnormal returns when the credit rating agencies downgraded the bonds of a company it had
insured by several steps prior to the Subprime Crisis. In contrast, however, Ambac's share
prices failed to respond significantly to even larger multistep downgrades of six of its twen-
ty-eight CDOs, even though Ambac's aggregate exposure on its CDSs far exceeded its fi-
nancial exposure on the downgraded corporate bonds that it had previously insured. In addi-
tion, Ambac's share prices fell significantly when Ambac itself announced, inter alia, sharp
reductions in book value due to growing liability from its CDSs, or sharp decreases in its
quarterly income-both pieces of bad news that predictably paralleled the earlier rating
downgrades of the CDOs "insured" by Ambac's CDSs. Bartlett acknowledges that share
prices might already discount for the bad news reflected by rating downgrades-the explana-
tion that we would find more intuitive. Bartlett, supra, at 31. Nevertheless, he rejects this ex-
planation, in part because of the market's seeming failure to respond to the bad news already
implicit in rating downgrades until poor earnings or asset write-downs make it too obvious to
overlook. Bartlett expresses his point in terms of "salience," that is, the hypothesis that even
savvy investors may overlook new information with large valuation consequences if it does
not appear salient at first glance. Id. at 54. Newspaper coverage or issuer disclosure may
make information salient, and therefore worthy of additional analysis, when arbitrageurs
might otherwise ignore it, simply because their time and attention are limited resources. Put-
ting aside event studies, we agree that the salience hypothesis is plausible. We would re-
frame it, however, not as cognitive bias but as a matter of information costs. Thus the cost of
learning bad news quickly enough to act on it may be high, but it becomes slightly lower on
an ex ante basis if newspaper coverage or issuer disclosure makes arbitrageurs more likely to
notice it. Regarded this way, salience is a matter of probability-discounted cost rather than of
cognitive bias. In this sense, the distinction is similar to that between behavioral and rational
accounts of herding. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79 See infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing accounting valuation of mort-
gage-backed securities); see also Bartlett, supra note 78, at 6-7 (identifying two circum-
stances when, because of particular regulators' requirements covering monoline insurers, an
insurer's exposure to CDOs and CDSs could, with difficulty, be roughly observed). Bartlett
also recounts the very large costs associated with the effort.
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first half of 2006.80 However, such strategic maneuvering was unlikely
to be visible to shareholders, and many other institutions of similar size
and reputation seemed unconcerned during this period. Again, the only
markets in which prices may have anticipated the coming Subprime Cri-
sis were the ABX BBB and BBB- subprime indices, as we discuss brief-
ly below. Even the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in three-month hous-
ing futures exhibited "relative stability in market expectations until a
decline in the fourth quarter of 2007 and then a precipitous drop at the
very end of 2007 and beginning of 2008."'
Thus, the evidence is that most astute investors did not anticipate a
steep drop in housing prices immediately prior to its occurrence, wheth-
er or not they believed in an enormous bubble in housing prices. This
outcome is entirely consistent with the ECMH, which maintains that
prices in a relatively efficient market will respond rapidly to new public
information, but does not maintain the converse proposition-namely,
that every sharp turn in market prices can be traced to identifiable fresh
public information. Nor, of course, does the ECMH permit information
to enter the market that fixes the time of future collapse in prices, since
such information cannot exist without immediately causing the collapse
it predicts.
D. A Note on Behavioral Finance
If the market behavior accompanying the Subprime Crisis is con-
sistent with the ECMH, can the same be said about its compatibility with
hypotheses rooted in behavioral finance? In an earlier article, we dis-
cussed the variety of behavioral hypothesis biases that might plausibly
interfere with rational pricing based on public information.82 Much of
80 See Tristana Moore, Deutsche Bank Boss Dodges Crisis, BBC News, (Feb. 8, 2008,
9:34 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7234292.stm; Neil Unmack & Sebastian
Boyd, CDO Losses May Be $52 Billion, Credit Suisse Says, Bloomberg, (July 9, 2007),
htp://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPKIHSk5cS50&refer-home.1 Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Securities Litigation and the Housing Market Downturn, 35
J. Corp. L. 97, 115 (2009).
82 See Gilson & Kraakman, Hindsight, supra note 39, at 736-41. In that article we
acknowledged that an analysis based in part on the cognitive biases of noise traders, as de-
scribed in the text below, very plausibly contributed to the dot.com bubble and subsequent
crash of 1999-2001. There, however, we emphasized the institutional half of the story. To be
sure, noise traders with systematic cognitive biases can distort prices even in very actively
traded markets in public equities, but they can only do so occasionally when activity by
noise traders is so intense that it short-circuits the arbitrage mechanism, and savvy traders
become unable or unwilling to police prices. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets:
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this important literature derives from work by the cognitive psycholo-
gists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who use experiments to
show how common cognitive biases lead individuals to systematically
mis-assess value.83 We will not review our earlier discussion here, much
less the additional progress made in behavioral finance since our inter-
vention. We do not doubt, for example, that the failure of CDO purchas-
ers to correctly assess the riskiness of these assets is consistent with a
theory of cognitive bias.
Instead we make a different point, one that goes to the plausibility ra-
ther than to the consistency of market frictions as the chief culprits in the
Subprime Crisis. Unsophisticated investors-noise traders rather than
institutional investors-are usually depicted as more vulnerable to cog-
nitive biases, and therefore more likely than professional investors to
distort market prices. Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard
An Introduction to Behavioral Finance 24 (2000). Arbitraging against the sentiment of obliv-
ious noise traders is very risky. It may be more profitable to trade into the bubble they create
in the hope of making a quick escape before it bursts. Low cost arbitrage also requires infra-
structure such as standardized CDS contracts and the ABX indices. Moreover, other frictions
arise when arbitrageurs trade with other people's money because outside investors do not
know whether a bad trade reflects bad judgment or only bad luck, and may therefore lose
their appetite for more investment. Therefore arbitrageurs have an incentive to be conserva-
tive when trading with other people's money. In contrast to our earlier article dealing with
the dot.com crisis, however, we argue below that cognitive bias is less likely to have played
a central role in the Subprime Crisis where almost all investors were institutions, savvy in-
termediaries, and professional traders. While some commentators argue that such profes-
sional investors are also subject to "distorted beliefs," it is very hard to distinguish this no-
tion with its overtone of cognitive impairment from entirely rational behavior under
circumstances of costly information and moral hazard created by informational intermediar-
ies. Economists working in the tradition of behavioral finance recognize the distinction be-
tween noise traders that might have played an important role in the dot.com bubble and the
sober-minded institutional investors collectively responsible for the Subprime Crisis. Brock
Mendel and Andrei Shleifer, for example, offer a clever model of the Crisis in which even
small numbers of noise traders might mislead the vast majority of sober-minded investors
who are attempting to decode price signals. See Brock Mendel & Andrei Shleifer, Chasing
Noise, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 303, 305 (2012). But from our perspective, their model is less about
irrational trading than about high information costs that lead investors to rationally misinter-
pret price signals.
83 For a collection of their early work, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Nicholas
Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1 Handbook of the Econom-
ics of Finance 1053 (G. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) and David Hirshleifer, Investor
Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. Fin. 1533, 1563-76 (2001) provide recent finance-
oriented surveys. Daniel Kahneman's receipt of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics for this
body of work is dramatic evidence of these psychologists' impact on economics. Because of
his untimely death, Amos Tversky was not eligible to share in the Nobel Prize award.
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Thaler's clever effort to explain the discount often associated with
closed-end mutual funds-one of the long-standing phenomena that con-
flicts with the implications of the ECMH-aptly illustrates the potential
for such misguided investors to influence price efficiency.84 When an
investor sells shares in a closed-end mutual fund, she receives what a
buyer is willing to pay, rather than a proportionate share of the fund's
net asset value. Because the net asset value of a closed-end fund is ob-
servable, the ECMH predicts that fund's stock price will reflect this val-
ue. In fact, closed-end funds systematically (but not uniformly) trade at
discounts from their net asset values-a longstanding "puzzle" for the
ECMH is that stock prices often diverge from asset values in the one
case in which these underlying values are observable.85
However, noise trading has limited explanatory power in the layered
markets that gave rise to the Subprime Crisis. The closest analogues to
noise traders during the Subprime Crisis were the house flippers and un-
fortunate homebuyers who agreed to mortgages they could not afford.86
For reasons developed earlier 87 housing prices were unlikely to have re-
flected the full costs of default risks and liars with any modicum of rela-
tive efficiency. At the other end of the CDO production chain, institu-
tional investors purchased AAA CDO bonds in a primary market
without real trading to aggregate price-relevant information. Such trad-
ing happened only in the intermediate markets in RMBSs and their de-
rivatives. These markets clearly were sensitive to new information bub-
bling up from the housing market and, in retrospect, plausibly predicted
price movements in the other markets as well. Figure 1 below shows
84 Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard Thaler, Investment Sentiment and the
Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J. Fin. 75 (1991). For the heated debate over econometrics in-
cited by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, see Nai-fu Chen, Raymond Kan & Merton Miller, Are the
Discounts on Closed-End Funds a Sentiment Index?, 48 J. Fin. 795 (1993), Navin Chopra et
al., Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds are a Sentiment Index, 48 J. Fin. 801 (1993), and
Nai-fu Chen, Raymond Kan & Merton Miller, A Rejoinder, 48 J. Fin. 809 (1993). Zingales
refers to the closed-end mutual fund phenomenon in his recent account of the challenges to
the ECMH. Zingales, supra note 11, at 33-36.
85 See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891, 892 (1988). But even here,
the absence of a valuation model makes a difference: For example, shares in closed-end eq-
uity funds are frequently less liquid than the widely traded securities that these funds hold.
Could liquidity risk be part of the valuation model?86 See Hill, supra note 75, at 51-52, for a plausible case that these borrowers made fully
rational decisions in buying homes they could not afford with money borrowed-at least for
the teaser period-at greatly below market interest rates.87 See Wallace, supra note 49, at 44.
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prices of the first and second vintages of ABX BBB- indices issued on
July 1, 2005 and January 1, 2006.88 As the graph suggests, the second
vintage 2006 of BBB- subprime bonds (ABX.HE.BBB-06-2) fell into
decline just five months after trading began and lost twenty percent of its
value by March 2007. By way of comparison, most commentators date
the onset of the Subprime Crisis to July or August 2007, when the same
index had already lost sixty percent of its value.
Note, too, that while some AAA bonds of mezzanine CDOs had lost
upwards of fifty percent of their value by the end of 2007, the senior
tranches of RMBS bonds retained almost all of their value.
Figure 1: ABX BBB-Subindex Prices
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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report reveals that twelve out of Ameri-
ca's thirteen most important financial institutions were at risk of failure
during 2008, while "[o]verall, for 2005 to 2007 vintage tranches of
mortgage-backed securities [i.e., RMBSs] originally rated triple-
A... only about 10% of [these bonds issued by Alt-A mortgage pools89]
and 4% of [AAA bonds issued by subprime mortgage pools] had been
'materially impaired'-meaning that losses were imminent or had al-
8 8 Figure 1 is taken from Gorton, Information, supra note 51, at 5.
89 Alt-A mortgages were those otherwise hard to classify and included a large portion of
the so-called liar loans, where borrowed claims about critical information such as income
and outstanding debt were accepted at face value without verification requirements.
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ready been suffered-by the end of 2009."90 This was not a bad record.
Unfortunately, it extended only to senior bonds in the single Crisis-
related market where shorting was cheap and sophisticated players trad-
ed actively. Without the emergence of CDOs to absorb the junior RMBS
bonds, new issuances of RMBSs might have declined, and the Subprime
Crisis might have been contained.
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A POST-CRISIS ECMH
As we suggested in Part I, a skeptic may dismiss our defense of a
modest ECMH in the wake of the Subprime Crisis. Of what policy value
is a hypothesis that fails to give strong proactive advice on how to pre-
vent asset bubbles-the market phenomenon at the heart of the Crisis?
In response, we have argued that the ECMH, properly understood, can
help to locate and reduce market frictions even if it cannot prevent mar-
ket bubbles. A modest ECMH can be a diagnostic tool for exploring
how closely real markets approximate the frictionless ideal. In addition,
it may also guide us, if we are very smart, in improving the institutions
that contribute to the informational efficiency of market prices, which in
turn may help mitigate the effect of bubbles.
This Part tentatively describes how a modest ECMH can inform regu-
latory strategy. Our ambition is purely illustrative. For us, the most im-
portant lesson that both the Internet bubble and the Subprime Crisis
teach is the extraordinary sensitivity of markets to the frictions that im-
pede information from informing prices, be these frictions the agency
costs of using informational intermediaries, the limitations of certain
market structures, or the sheer cost of acquiring information about com-
plex and opaque market instruments and successfully evaluating them.
Further, we argue that increasing the relative efficiency of market
prices complements the effectiveness of regulation. Well-designed regu-
lation should seek to increase price transparency, while greater transpar-
ency, in turn, should facilitate regulatory effectiveness. In this virtuous
circle, greater relative efficiency of asset prices can reveal the success of
regulatory intervention--or reveal the failure of disingenuous regulation
90 Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 228-29 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
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that stems from the negative impact of public sector agency problems on
the relative efficiency of market prices. 9"
We illustrate the interaction between markets and regulation by dis-
cussing two categories of regulatory responses to the Subprime Crisis,
each of which corresponds to a pillar of the ECMH: (1) regulation that
affects information costs, and (2) regulation that affects the market's ca-
pacity to aggregate and impound information into price.92 In the first
category, two regulatory responses to the Crisis seem to move in the
right direction: the Federal Reserve's program of stress testing banks
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's
("Dodd-Frank") tentative steps toward increasing mandatory disclosure.
A third information-relevant reform that surfaced in the Crisis's wake,
however, moved in the wrong direction. This was the (temporary) deci-
sion of the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") to allow
financial institutions to relax fair-value accounting standards in valuing
financial assets.
With respect to the second pillar of the ECMH, we describe interven-
tions that might encourage information aggregation (through trading and
short selling) and address structural reforms intended to increase the vis-
ibility of price and trading volume information to traders and market
regulators alike. Here, however, we remain agnostic about possible re-
forms, as befits our limited knowledge about the structure at issue.
A. Regulation and Information Costs
Appropriately, we begin with post-Crisis regulatory interventions that
might influence the costs of acquiring, verifying, and valuing infor-
mation.
1. Expanding Disclosure
Increased mandatory disclosure is the simplest response to market
failure that turns on information costs. Disclosure was inadequate within
91 This argument parallels that made by Jeffrey Gordon with respect to the role and effec-
tiveness of independent directors. In Gordon's account, the increased informational efficien-
cy of stock prices allowed independent directors to undertake a much more vigorous moni-
toring role in corporate governance. Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in
the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L.
Rev. 1465, 1541 (2007).
92 See supra Part III (discussing the role of information costs in determining relative in-
formational efficiency and summarizing the mechanisms of market efficiency).
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and across all markets implicated in the Crisis: from homebuyers to
lenders, from mortgage originators to securitizers, from the issuers of
RMBS bonds to the RMBS market, from the sponsors and underwriters
of RMBS CDOs to the rating agencies, and, most importantly, from
CDO underwriters and rating agencies to the ultimate institutional pur-
chasers of CDO AAA bonds. One of several examples emerges from an
empirical study undertaken by the Committee on Capital Markets, which
found that only some RMBS issuers provided granular level disclosure
about the mortgages behind particular securitizations, and even these is-
suers failed to include more than a third of the data considered "essen-
tial" by more than eighty percent of the sample of institutional buyers of
RMBS-backed bonds.93 Disclosure of dynamic loan-level information
prior to the Subprime Crisis was even scarcer.
94
At the opposite end of the CDO assembly line, disclosure about the
assets underlying AAA CDOs was still less forthcoming. Each bespoke
CDO included bonds backed by different tranches of numerous RMBSs
and even other CDOs. The pooled cash flows from these motley assets
were then re-divided (or "restructured") into the CDO's unique scheme
of tranches, which governed the "waterfall" of cash flows to its num-
bered tranches of bonds according to its own complex timing and distri-
bution rules. There was seniority among tranches of course, but it was
often quirky seniority arising from the over-collateralization of some
tranches and similar modifications. To further complicate matters, CDO
managers actively bought and sold portfolio assets within specified lim-
its. As the number of tranches and the variety of CDO assets grew, the
information required for a thorough valuation also grew exponentially. 95
93 COmM. on Capital Mkts., The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan for Regulatory Reform
146-48 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMRReport_(5-26-
09).pdf.
9 Id. at 148-50 (reporting that the data available are so voluminous that the database from
a single third-party provider contains upwards of one billion rows of data); see Scott Peppet,
Smart Mortgages, Privacy and the Regulatory Possibility of Infomediation 11 (Univ. of Colo.
Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 09-13, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1458064 (providing a helpful survey of information problems confronting investors
in mortgage-backed securities and derivatives).
95 John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused,
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis 13 (2009); Gorton, The Subprime Panic, supra
note 5 1, at 45, 49. Robert Bartlett recounts efforts by one hedge fund to evaluate two mono-
line insurers' exposure to CDOs. Even though the two insurers had only twenty-eight and
thirty direct exposures, after drilling down, the hedge fund determined that each insurer was
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Remember too that CDO managers actively bought new assets and sold
old ones. From the perspective of the institutional purchasers of CDO-
backed bonds, the prospect of actually valuing these bonds from the
ground up ranged from impossible to "merely" extraordinarily diffi-
cult.96 But this question was largely moot since "few investors [in CDO
bonds] actually went to the trouble [of attempting to analyze them]."97
The story of the Subprime Crisis wound down as the real estate mar-
ket collapsed and the last CDO bonds were placed at the end of 2007. As
AAA CDO bonds came to be perceived as risky, other securitized assets
did as well. By 2008, no one would buy CDO or even RMBS bonds on
the OTC market because no one knew their value. Moreover, the many
banks and other financial institutions holding CDOs and RMBSs were
forced to write down the value of these assets. Further, collateral calls by
CDS holders on CDS writers forced fire sales and additional write-
downs of CDOs, ultimately forcing AIG into government ownership and
Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy. And so the Subprime Crisis morphed
into the broader Financial Crisis. As Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz
wrote, "These [AAA CDO] instruments caused an information crisis in
which parties refused to enter into transactions with each other whenever
exposed to over 3,000 unique tranches of MBS and over 400 CDOs. Bartlett, supra note 78,
at 44.96 COMM. on Capital Mkts., supra note 93, at 150. Robert Bartlett's case study of Pershing
Square's efforts to short two monoline insurers because of their CDO exposure illustrates the
point. Pershing Square went to a great deal of effort to develop an "open source" computer
model that valued the insurers' CDO exposure and wrote a number of research reports ex-
plaining Pershing Square's negative assessment (and its short position on the insurers'
stock). Nonetheless, Pershing Square's model, available to others, and its reports, which
proved ex post to be far more accurate than the market's valuation as reflected in the insur-
ers' stock price, failed to trigger widespread shorting of the insurers' stock by professional
investors, the drivers of the professionally informed trading mechanism. Bartlett, supra note
78, at 42-48. For our purposes, the central point is that Pershing Square's model was disput-
ed by the insurers, id. at 6-7, was inconsistent with the market, and would have been very
difficult and expensive for any other potential arbitrageur to confirm by replicating the mod-
el independently. In that circumstance, we would expect the Pershing Square information to
be reflected in price only slowly-relatively inefficiently-as the market gradually acquires
new information that confirms the general accuracy of the Pershing Square model. Pershing
Square plainly was trying to engage the professionally informed trading mechanism by mak-
ing its model available to all; however, it underestimated the costs of confirming the model's
credibility. This is consistent with the information-based barriers to the adoption of new and
innovative trading instruments; it takes time for the market to understand and determine the
appropriate valuation model. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 585; Awrey, supra
note 4, at 43 ("[N]ewer and more innovative financial instruments invariably demand the
incursion of high (initial) costs on the part of both market participants and regulators.").
97 Comm. on Capital Mkts., supra note 93, at 150.
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doing so involved counterparty risk because no one knew who held bad
paper.
' 98
So much for the diagnosis. What about the treatment? From the
standpoint of acquiring and verifying information, the ideal treatment
might be to assign each mortgage and the RMBS portfolio a unique
number that would allow investors at each market level to track the per-
formance of these assets, even when portfolios are updated and assets
are bought and sold. The addition of mandatory programs to the water-
falls of cash through the tranches of CDOs and RMBSs might be neces-
sary as well. 99
But would such a registration regime be worth the candle? There is an
enormous political roadblock. A half dozen federal agencies and the pri-
vate sector would have to cooperate to implement such a thorough dis-
closure regime. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") is responsible under the Securities Act of 1933 for disclosures
concerning publicly offered instruments in securitized pools, as well as
private offerings of such securities, and the circumstances under which
periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be
terminated with respect to previously registered securitization instru-
ments.100 The FASB is responsible for the accounting rules that govern
98 Harry M. Markowitz, Proposals Concerning the Current Financial Crisis, 65 Fin. Ana-
lysts J., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 25; see Matthew Pritsker, Informational Easing: Improving Credit
Conditions Through the Release of Information, 16 Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Econ. Pol'y Rev.
77, 82 (2010) ("Interbank spreads increased appreciably because of uncertainty over which
banks were exposed to housing-and especially uncertainty over which banks were exposed
to subprime loans.").
99 For useful accounts of the distribution of regulatory authority, see Peppet, supra note 94,
at 45-56, and Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A
Problem with Three Dimensions 5-19 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Work-
ing Paper Series, Paper No. 10-40, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=- 1649657.
U Among other Dodd-Frank sections, §§ 942(a) and (b) address these issues. Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Dodd-Frank § 942(a) established an ongoing reporting obli-
gation for issuers of all ABS classes for which a registration statement has become effective
pursuant to the Securities Act, and it also allowed the SEC to propose rules providing for the
suspension of this duty to file for any class of ABS. Id. Effective September 22, 2011, the
SEC adopted rules to provide thresholds for suspension of the reporting requirements for
ABS issuers and also amended rules relating to the Exchange Act reporting requirements of
ABS issuers. Id. For example, amended Exchange Act Rule 15d-22(b) provides for suspen-
sion of reporting obligations for ABS classes in certain circumstances. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15d-22 (2013). For more detail on the final rule changes, see Suspension of the Duty
to File Reports for Classes of Asset-Backed Securities Under Section 15(D) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,549 (Aug. 23, 2011). Dodd-Frank § 942(b) adds
§ 7(c) to the Securities Act to require ABS issuers to disclose certain loan-level information
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when banks must consolidate securitizations for purposes of their finan-
cial statements and, it follows, for purposes of disclosure under SEC
rules. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is responsible for reg-
ulating the terms of, and disclosure concerning, securitizations undertak-
en by insured institutions, including consolidation policy for purposes of
regulatory review. In the private sector, the American Securitization Fo-
rum, a trade group, has proposed disclosure reforms through its Project
Restart,10 1 which would specify loan-level disclosure and computer-
based mechanisms through which this could be traced through fragmen-
tation levels, dramatically reducing the costs of acquiring the infor-
mation necessary to value MBSs, CDOs and CDSs. Thus, multi-party
regulatory and voluntary efforts to improve disclosure must demonstrate
considerable promise to overcome their political costs.
Demonstrating such promise is both practically and conceptually dif-
ficult. Buyers accepted low returns on AAA bonds because they were
presumptively (almost) risk-free assets. As Jean Tirole's recent survey
of the literature on illiquidity indicates, there is a tradeoff between re-
turns and the informational demands of fixed income securities. 0 2 Pur-
portedly safe securities pay low returns precisely because their buyers
need not do due diligence beyond reviewing the grades assigned by the
rating agencies, that is, third parties assumed to be credible information-
al intermediaries.0 3  But Vi Tri Dang, Gary Gorton, and Bengt
Holmstrom show that if subsequent bad news undermines the credibility
of the credit raters, the jig is up. 10 4 Rated securities suddenly become in-
formation sensitive, leading to one of three results: their prices drop far
enough to restore absolute belief in their safety, their buyers acquire val-
for the assets backing the security for each tranche or class of security. The SEC was tasked
with setting standards for the format of data to be provided and with requiring issuers to dis-
close asset-level or loan-level data. On July 26, 2011, the SEC re-proposed rules requiring
this asset-level information, but currently final rules have not been put forth. See Re-
Proposed Rule: Re-Proposal of Shelf Eligibility Conditions for Asset-Backed Securities, 76
Fed. Reg. 47,948 (proposed Aug. 5, 2011).
101 American Securitization Forum, ASF Project Restart: ASF RMBS Disclosure and Re-
porting Packages (July 15, 2009), http://www.americansecuritization.com/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6707.
102 See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. Econ. Literature 287, 302-03
(2011).
103 Id. at 302.
104 See Vi Tri Dang, Gary Gorton & Bengt Holstrom, Ignorance, Debt, and Financial Cri-
ses 2-3 (Mar. 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-td2332/PaperIgnorance.pdf.
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uation skills, or they eventually no longer have buyers and become com-
pletely illiquid. Dang et al. conclude that when there is gross failure of
informational intermediaries to anticipate bad news "[t]he shock is am-
plified, leading to a crisis."105 One implication of this analysis is that the
former purchasers of CDO AAA bonds may not want an elaborate dis-
closure system to safeguard against misleading or inflated credit ratings.
For them, a superior outcome might be increasing the reliability of credit
rating agencies.
Dodd-Frank has already taken a step in this direction by mandating
that rating agencies disclose the principal assumptions behind their
models even if some details must remain proprietary. 10 6 Once imple-
mented, such disclosure would presumably expose rating methodologies
to careful scrutiny (and to additional gaming as well). Another reform
might be to leverage the reputations of agencies by requiring that they
periodically report on the aggregate accuracy of their past ratings-a re-
port that might be accompanied by a performance-related award or fi-
ne.' °7 We cannot hazard a guess as to whether these or other constraints
on rating agencies would prove cost effective. The perennial objection is
that they could be contracted for if they really were effective, and the
perennial response is that without experimentation even the market can-
not know value ex ante.
105 Id. at 3.
106 On May 18, 2011, the SEC proposed rules containing this requirement. Proposed rule
Section 15E(s)(1) of the Exchange Act, for example, requires that NRSROs provide, along
with any credit rating, a form containing information relating to the assumptions underlying
the credit rating procedures and methodologies and the data that were relied on to determine
the credit rating. As of publication, however, final rules have not been promulgated. See Na-
tionally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,456 (proposed
June 8, 2011).
107 For a discussion of possible reforms relating to rating agency accuracy, see Coffee, su-
pra note 45, at 246-71. One potential solution-placing the CRA fee in escrow and entitling
investors to "claw back" the fee if the rating proves accurate-could address the issue that
the accuracy of the rating is determined only over the long run, while the fee is paid in the
short run. Id. at 253. Coffee goes on to consider the merits of using a system where the gov-
ernment chooses a CRA to use, as compared to a system where the CRA rotates. Id. at 256-
58. Coffee concludes, essentially, that the former "could degenerate into a means for distrib-
uting patronage and political payoffs" and that the latter would provide no incentive for rat-
ing agency accuracy. Id. at 257-58. Finally, Coffee considers the merits of a subscriber-pays
model, where institutions would have to obtain a credit rating from the CRA of their choos-
ing. Id. at 256-59, 269. He concludes that this model would foster competition and thus put
more emphasis on a CRA's reputation for accuracy, but doubts that investors themselves
would be willing to pay for a rating. Id. at 258-59.
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A final limitation on disclosure as a regulatory strategy is the sheer
complexity of some investment instruments. As capital markets grow
more complete, financial innovations grow more complex. The ECMH
predicts that the price stability of novel securities increases with market
experience and improved modeling. We cannot rule out the possibility,
however, that the dangers posed by a class of securities cannot be de-
tected or easily rectified by their designers soon enough to prevent fi-
nancial chaos. In some cases, only strong regulatory controls or outright
prohibition may do. If we cannot predict (and prevent) earthquakes, we
can at least adopt building codes that make a human catastrophe less
likely.
2. Bank Stress Tests
It is widely accepted that the transition from the Subprime Crisis to
the Financial Crisis occurred with the freezing of the credit markets.
Several things occurred at once. The value of senior CDO notes dropped
precipitously as they lost their risk-free reputation in the market. Simul-
taneously, investors and banks realized that little was known about how
much exposure individual banks carried to the risks associated with
these assets.10 8 Banks responded to these epiphanies by sharply reducing
lending while increasing the collateral they demanded for new loans.
This dramatic decline in bank lending-combined with a similar decline
in lending in the shadow banking market-led to a liquidity crisis.109 In-
formation about the financial conditions of banks remained prohibitively
costly until the state intervened to assess the financial health of individ-
ual banks." 0
One part of the Treasury's Financial Stability package announced in
January 2008 was directed at producing information about the condition
108 "Interbank spreads increased appreciably because of uncertainty over which banks were
exposed to housing-and especially uncertainty over which banks were exposed to subprime
loans." Pritsker, supra note 98, at 82.
109 "[D]uring the financial crisis of 2007-2009, interbank spreads increased markedly, and
lending through the interbank market declined." Id. at 79. Gary Gorton stresses that the lack
of information concerning the assets that underlay mortgage-backed securities either held by
banks or as to which banks had a residual stake contributed importantly to the uncertainty.
Gary Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, at 62-65 (2010); see also
Markowitz, supra note 98, at 25 ("These instruments caused an information crisis in which
parties refused to enter into transactions with each other whenever doing so involved coun-
terparty risk because no one knew who held bad paper.").10 Pritsker, supra note 98, at 82.
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of large U.S. banks. Through the Supervisory Capital Assessment Pro-
gram ("SCAP," or the "Stress Test"), the Treasury required each of the
nineteen largest U.S. banks, representing some two-thirds of all U.S.
bank assets,"' to simultaneously undertake a Treasury-specified assess-
ment of the bank's capital two years into the future under two different
scenarios-one baseline and one more adverse-in order to identify
whether the bank had sufficient capital under each. The methodology of
the Stress Test was publicly disclosed so that its credibility could be in-
dependently evaluated.' 12 Banks that reported a capital shortfall would
be required to raise new capital in that amount, which the Treasury
would provide if the market would not. Importantly, the Treasury pub-
licly announced the results of the Stress Test, and the corresponding de-
termination of capital adequacy. The Stress Test revealed that ten of the
banks had inadequate capital, while nine had sufficient capital. Of the
banks that had to raise new capital, the size of the shortfall ranged from
$0.6 billion to $33.9 billion.
From our perspective, the Stress Test resurrected the market in inter-
bank lending by generating new information about the credit worthiness
of the largest U.S. banks." 3 Of course, the market itself might have gen-
erated the same information more cheaply-but it did not when this in-
formation was critical. A recent paper provides evidence of the new in-
formation the Stress Test provided."14 Peristian et al. report the results of
111 Stavros Peristian, Donald P. Morgan & Vanessa Savino, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Staff Report No. 460, The Information Value of the Stress Test and Bank Opacity 4 (2010),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=-1650670.
u2 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Supervisory Capital Assessment Pro-
gram: Design and Implementation 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/bcreg20090424al.pdf.
113 Daniel K. Tarullo, a Federal Reserve Governor, also appears to have been persuaded
that the stress tests provided new information to the market:
[B]ecause loan portfolios are inherently difficult to value without a great deal of de-
tailed information, increased transparency could be an important addition to the in-
formation available to investors and counterparties of the largest institutions ....
The market discipline made possible by such means as special resolution mechanisms
and contingent capital will be most effective if market participants have adequate in-
formation with which to make informed judgments about the banks.
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Lessons from the Cri-
sis Stress Tests, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board International Research Forum on
Monetary Policy 9 (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo20100326a.pdf.
114 See Peristian et al., supra note 111, at 1-4. Other sources provide interview evidence of
the value of SCAP disclosed information: "A broad set of market indicators also suggest that
the public release of SCAP results may have helped reduce uncertainty in the financial mar-
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an event study measuring the stock price response of two categories of
the nineteen large U.S. banks that were required to conduct the Stress
Test: the ten banks that the Stress Test revealed needed more capital,
and the nine banks whose capital the Stress Test showed was adequate.
The stock prices of the nine banks the Stress Test showed to have ade-
quate capital experienced no abnormal returns on announcement of the
results. The authors interpret this result as consistent with the market
previously having identified the banks that were adequately capitalized.
For these banks, the Stress Test provided no new information."1 5
In contrast, the stock prices of the ten banks that the Stress Test
showed to require significant additional capital experienced significant
positive abnormal returns on announcement of their capital deficiency.
The authors interpret this as showing that the Stress Test credibly in-
formed the market that banks suspected to be weak were stronger than
had been anticipated.
1 6
In late 2011, following the Stress Tests, the Federal Reserve Board fi-
nalized a rule requiring U.S. bank holding companies with consolidated
assets of $50 billion or more to submit annual capital plans for review in
a program known as the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
("CCAR"). 1 7 The stress testing under CCAR is conducted annually.
kets and increased market confidence." U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10--861,
Bank Stress Test Offers Lessons as Regulators Take Further Actions to Strengthen Supervi-
sory Oversight 23 (2010).
15 Peristian et al., supra note 11, at 14.
116 See Peristian et al., supra note 111, at 15 (noting that abnormal returns were important
for SCAP banks, but trivial for the next fifty). Daniel K. Tarullo, a Federal Reserve Gover-
nor, made the point directly:
[T]he [SCAP] results were released at a time when uncertainty about bank conditions
were very high, and some market participants feared the worst. That is, perceptions of
tail risk were very high, and the SCAP results helped reassure market participants that
under a severe but plausible scenario, the capital needs of the largest U.S. banks were
manageable.
Tarullo, supra note 113, at 4-5. Frederic S. Mishkin, another Federal Reserve Governor,
reached the same conclusion: "The stress tests were a key factor that helped increase the
amount of information in the marketplace, thereby reducing asymmetric information and ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems." Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the
Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 49, 62 (2010).
P1Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Nov. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20111122a.htm. In 2012, the CCAR
was required for the same nineteen bank holding companies that had participated in SCAP,
plus twelve additional firms with at least $50 billion in assets that had not previously partici-
pated in stress testing. Id. In 2013, one of the nineteen bank holding companies, MetLife,
Inc., did not participate because it was in the process of deregistering as a bank holding
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Each bank holding company's capital plan must include detailed de-
scriptions of: "the [holding company's] processes for assessing capital
adequacy; the policies governing capital actions such as common stock
issuance, dividends, and share repurchases; and all planned capital ac-
tions over a nine-quarter reporting horizon."' 18 In addition, each holding
company must report to the Federal Reserve the results of various stress
tests that assess the sources and uses of capital under both baseline and
stressed economic conditions. " 9
The first CCAR results, released on March 13, 2012, were promising.
The stress scenario included a peak unemployment rate of thirteen per-
cent, a fifty percent drop in equity prices, and a twenty-one percent de-
cline in housing prices, which would result in losses at the nineteen bank
holding companies totalling $534 billion. 20 Despite these heavy hypo-
thetical losses, fifteen of the nineteen bank holding companies were es-
timated to maintain capital ratios above the regulatory minimum levels,
even when accounting for proposed capital actions like dividend in-
creases or share buybacks.' 21
An addition to the Federal Reserve's stress testing regime came in
October 2012 when it finalized the Dodd-Frank stress test, which is sim-
ilar to but distinct from the CCAR capital adequacy test. 22 The Dodd-
Frank stress test implemented Dodd-Frank sections 165(i)(1) and (i)(2),
which required both supervisory and company-run stress testing over a
wider set of institutions than those covered by the CCAR. 123 Institutions
subject to the Dodd-Frank stress test include those bank holding compa-
nies with assets of $50 billion or more that had participated in SCAP
(and who had also participated the previous year in CCAR), as well as
bank holding companies with between $10 billion and $50 billion in as-
sets, and state member banks and savings and loan holding companies
company when the 2013 process began. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Com-
prehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2013: Assessment Framework and Results 9 n.10
(2013) [hereinafter Assessment Framework], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf.
"I Tarullo, supra note 113, at 3.
It9 id.
120 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Mar. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120313a.htm.
'21Id.
122 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20121009a.htm.
'
23 Assessment Framework, supra note 117, at 10.
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with over $10 billion in assets. 124 The main difference between the
CCAR and the Dodd-Frank stress tests is the capital action assumptions
that are combined with pre-tax net income projections to estimate post-
stress capital levels.2 5 The Dodd-Frank test uses a standard set of capital
action assumptions that are laid out in the Dodd-Frank test rules, while
the CCAR analysis uses the bank holding company's planned capital ac-
tions to determine whether the company would meet supervisory expec-
tations for capital minimums in stressful economic conditions.
2 6
For the institutions that had participated in SCAP, the results of the
CCAR and Dodd-Frank stress tests were publicly disclosed in March
2013.127 The Federal Reserve approved the capital plans of fourteen of
the financial institutions, conditionally approved the plans of two
more-which must be resubmitted for approval later in 2013-and ob-
jected to the plans of the final two, which must be resubmitted after cor-
recting any deficiencies.2 8 The remainder of the companies subject to
stress testing under the Dodd-Frank requirements were not required to
conduct their first stress tests until the fall of 2013 and will not have to
publicly disclose results of that test.
129
Despite the success of SCAP and the subsequent stress tests, there is
still debate over the merits of publicly disclosing the stress test results of
individual banks. Some banks object because they fear that, in normal
times when confidence in the banking system is not in jeopardy, public
disclosure of the capital needs of individual banks may result in runs on
weaker banks or in a competitive disadvantage that will prevent weaker
banks from earning their way out of capital shortages. 30 Commentators
124 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2013: Supervi-
sory Stress Test Methodology and Results 3 nn.7-8 (2013) [hereinafter Supervisory Stress
Test], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/dodd-frank-act-
stress-testing.htm.
125 Assessment Framework, supra note 117, at 5.126 Id.
127 See Supervisory Stress Test, supra note 124; Assessment Framework, supra note 117, at
4.
128 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Mar. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130314a.htm.
'29 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 122.
130 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 114, at 42; see Itay Goldstein & Haresh
Sapra, Should Banks' Stress Test Results Be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Bene-
fits 2 (Apr. 2, 2012) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation) (on file with author), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-itayg/Files/
stresstests.pdf; see also Tarullo, supra note 113, at 9 (arguing that disclosure may be unnec-
essarily destabilizing).
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echo this fear as well, noting that market participants' ex post reactions
to stress test results may not be efficient.' 3l Participants may put more
weight than is warranted on the public disclosure (in turn reducing the
weight they place on their own valuable private information) because the
disclosure provides information not only about the banks' health but also
about how other market participants may react, which in turn will influ-
ence how they react.
132
Our relative efficiency perspective, however, makes us skeptical of
these arguments. Frequent and repeated stress tests would inform the
market of the capital deficiencies of banks in time to allow management
to address the capital gap well short of the point at which it might initi-
ate a bank run. Such tests would also provide regulators with early warn-
ings of conditions they could better address sooner rather than later. In
contrast, hiding capital weakness in the hope it will go away serves nei-
ther to discipline the bank managers who have placed their banks in that
position,'33 nor to force the attention of the regulators on the problem. It
also misleads the public, whose funds are deposited in these institutions
and who may have invested in the institutions' securities. We think the
lesson of a relative market efficiency assessment counsels powerfully in
favor of continued transparency. 134
131 Goldstein & Sapra, supra note 130, at 27.
132 Id. at 18. Goldstein and Sapra discuss two other negative effects that could come from
increased disclosure (possible sub-optimal decisions of banks ex ante, and a reduction in
traders' incentives to gather information) but conclude that disclosure would be beneficial on
the whole because it would promote financial stability. Id. at 8, 24, 29. Til Schuermann
agrees that disclosure may disincentivize market participants from generating private infor-
mation and trading on it, and thus proposes an intermediate disclosure solution. Now that
trust in the banking system has been somewhat regained, Schuermann proposes disclosing
stress test results in the aggregate in order to provide the market with information while main-
taining an incentive for market participants to gather information. Til Schuermann, Stress Testing
Banks 19 (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/
fie/papers/12/12-08.pdf.
133 Indeed, it would operate in the opposite direction. Allowing management of an under-
capitalized bank more time to "earn" its way out of a capital deficit is to allow management
(and shareholders) to increase the value of their out of the money option by lengthening its
term. The same analysis suggests that the time would be used to increase the riskiness of the
bank's assets.
134 Financial commentators agree that rigorous and transparent stress testing was a critical
aspect of the recovery of the banking system in the United States after 2009. Correlatively,
there is widespread concern today that insufficiently rigorous and transparent testing will
cost the E.U. banking system and broader economy dearly in 2014 and beyond. See, e.g.,
Sam Fleming & Patrick Jenkins, Unanswered Questions Hang Over Euro Bank Tests, Fin.
Times (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85ddc416-3c00-1 le3-985 1-
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3. A Bad Intervention: Relaxing Fair Value Reporting Standards
The Treasury Department's and Federal Reserve Board's stress tests
had the explicit goal of providing to the market credible new public in-
formation concerning the financial condition of large U.S. banks. In con-
trast, the FASB's Financial Crisis-motivated expansion of a bank's dis-
cretion over the balance sheet values assigned to financial assets was the
stress tests' evil twin; it reduced the amount, credibility, and usefulness
of accounting information available to the market. The Treasury De-
partment rejected the argument that public disclosure of the real capitali-
zation of banks would worsen the Financial Crisis. The FASB made a
different choice.
Understanding how the FASB relaxed the requirements of fair value
accounting in April 2009 requires a brief description of the framework at
that time for valuing assets under U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP"). 35 For purposes of assessing the impact of ac-
counting rules on financial institutions, the critical starting point is ac-
counting for loans as set forth under Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards ("SFAS") 1 15;136 in general, loans are the largest category of
large U.S. financial institutions' balance sheet assets.'37 Under SFAS
115, accounting for loans differs depending on whether the loans are
held for sale or held for investment-that is, depending on the expecta-
tion that the loan will be held until maturity. Loans held for sale, for ex-
ample loans being warehoused before being securitized, are carried at
fair value. A loan held for investment is carried at the lower of fair value
or amortized cost, with a write-down to fair value required if the loan's
value drops below cost. Loans held for investment are the most signifi-
00144feab7de.html (stating that U.S. stress tests of 2009 are the "gold standard" and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank should "measure up to the U.S. precedent" despite opposition from
banks and Member States, or face serious economic consequences).
135 International Financial Accounting Standards approach these questions in a broadly
similar way. Discussion of these standards is beyond the scope of our effort here.136 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115
(1993), at 5. SFAS 115 is now codified as Accounting Standards Codification ("ASC") Top-
ic 320.
137 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting
104 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf;
Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial
Crisis?, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 93, 98 (2010) ("'Loans and leases' are by far the most important
asset class for bank holding companies and generally account for half or more of these
banks' total assets.").
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cant asset class on U.S. banks' balance sheets, representing fifty-eight
percent of balance sheet assets at the end of the first quarter of 2008.38
This brings us to SFAS 157, entitled "Fair Value Measurements. 139
SFAS 157 does not in itself require the application of fair value account-
ing to any class of assets. Rather, it specifies the manner in which fair
value is determined for assets, like loans held for sale rather than for in-
vestment (to maturity), that other accounting standards prescribe be car-
ried at fair value.1 40
SFAS 157 defines fair value as "the price that would be received to
sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction be-
tween market participants at the measurement date.' 4' So far, matters
are clear enough. When there are a large number of arm's length trans-
actions involving identical assets, determining fair value is mechanical.
But what happens when frequency of transactions and the value of sub-
prime mortgages and related derivatives drop precipitously, as was the
case with these instruments? For purposes of financial statement presen-
tation, the questions were: By how much did the value of these assets
drop and how would the drop be shown on bank balance sheets? Be-
cause of the freeze-up in the credit markets, 142 the banks believed that
the limited number of observable market transactions were at unrealisti-
cally low prices-that is, that the fundamental values of these loans were
higher than the price that could be obtained in the market under crisis
138 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 137, at 104 n.145.
139 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting Standards Update No. 2011-04, Fair Value
Measurement (Topic 820): Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and
Disclosure Requirements in U.S. GAAP and IFRSs 162 (2011), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&
blobwhere=1 175822486936&blobheader=application/pdf.
140 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157:
Fair Value Measurements (2006). SFAS 157 is now codified as ASC Topic 820. See Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd., supra note 139. In May 2011, the International Accounting
Standards Board ("IASB") and FASB worked together to update Topic 820 through Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") No. 13. The updated Topic 820, like SFAS
157, does not require the use of fair value accounting, but instead provides guidance on its
application. See News Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB, IASB and FASB Is-
sue Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements (May 12, 2011), available
at http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB/FASBContentC/NewsPage&cid=
1176158544944.
141 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., supra note 140, 5. This definition remained consistent
in the Accounting Standards Update to Topic 820. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., supra
note 139, at 196.
142 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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conditions. Did the loans have to be valued at the price for which they
could be sold at the moment, or could banks exercise judgment in valu-
ing the assets for balance sheet purposes?
Proponents of suspending or relaxing the application of SFAS 157
during the Financial Crisis typically identified bank regulation as the
link between accounting valuation methods and real economic conse-
quences. 43 In this account, balance sheet values are the inputs into the
bank supervisor's calculation of capital adequacy. A write-down of loan
(asset) values results in increased bank leverage. To satisfy capital re-
quirements, banks would then be forced to reduce leverage by selling
loans or other assets at, in their view, artificially low prices. In turn, in-
creased sales into a barely functioning market would further reduce
market prices, which would set off another round of sales as other banks
marked their loans to the new market. The problem was said to have sys-
temic effects because asset sales by one bank would result in reduced as-
set values for other banks, causing a system-wide reduction in bank
capital. This reduction, in turn, would reduce the financial system's ca-
pacity to make loans, thereby deepening the recession.
The FASB responded to the political pressure by easing the applica-
tion of SFAS 157 in two ways. First, it loosened the standards under
SFAS 115 that governed when an asset would be treated as held for in-
vestment and therefore carried at historical cost rather than at fair value.
Second, its relaxation of SFAS 157 increased a company's discretion to
move assets into Level 3, where assets could be "marked-to-model" in
the absence of reliable market price information. The result was a con-
siderable increase in the discretion of financial institutions to determine
the fair value of their balance-sheet assets.
144
143 See Laux & Leuz, supra note 137, at 95 ("The most commonly suggested and most
plausible mechanism through which fair-value accounting could contribute to a financial cri-
sis involves the link between accounting and bank capital regulation."); Richard A. Epstein
& M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The Dangerous Allure of Mark to
Market, 36 J. Corp. L. 513, 513 (2011). For theoretical models of how fair value accounting
could affect real performance, see, for example, G.H. Plantin, H. Sapra & H.S. Shin, Mark-
ing-to-Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 46 J. Acct. Res. 435, 437 (2008).
Laux & Leuz, supra note 137, at 109. See generally Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.,
Staff Position No. FAS 157-4, Determining Fair Value When the Volume and Level of Ac-
tivity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and Identifying Transactions That
Are Not Orderly (2009), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=
FASB%2FDocumentC%2FDocumentPage&cid= 176154545450 (detailing that even if
there had been a decrease in the level of activity for assets or liabilities, the objective of a
fair value measurement is the same).
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Proponents of the changes argued that improving relative market effi-
ciency by disclosure also comes at a heavy cost: Decreasing financial in-
stitutions' forward capital on the books results in contagion effects and
increases the likelihood of a recession. The Subprime Crisis demon-
strates that increasing relative efficiency is just not worth the costs. But
three important weaknesses, two empirical and one analytical, under-
mine this argument.
The first empirical point is straightforward-banks had too few loans
actually subject to SFAS 157 to make any difference. 45 A number of
empirical studies strongly suggest that SFAS 157 had no impact on the
Financial Crisis. For example, at the close of the first quarter of 2008,
the SEC 133 Study found that thirty-one percent of total bank assets
were subject to fair value accounting under SFAS 157.146 However, vir-
tually all of these assets (twenty-nine percent of total assets) were in-
vestment assets, trading assets, or derivatives. Thus, the overwhelming
percentage of loans, including especially subprime loans, were carried at
historical cost, and were not subject to fair value adjustment unless they
became impaired. Financial institutions may have sold assets during the
credit crisis, but fair value accounting did not cause their sale, and there-
fore did not cause contagion.
The second empirical problem is that the evidence suggests that com-
panies will take advantage of discretion over balance sheet values to
overstate the carrying value of assets. Christian Laux and Christian Leuz
report two examples of circumstances in which banks appear to have ex-
ercised discretion to overstate asset values when accounting standards
permitted them to do so. The first example is the reluctance of banks to
write down the goodwill created by past acquisitions of other banks.
"[O]f the 50 U.S. banks that made substantial acquisitions prior to the
financial crisis, 35 banks have not written down their goodwill positions
145 For example, Peter Wallison argues that SFAS 115 was too restrictive in allowing a
company to treat a loan as held to maturity, with the result that it was subject to SFAS 157.
Peter J. Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: A Critique, AEI Online (July 28, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/outlook/28389. Sanders Shaffer notes, however, that as of the close of the
first quarter of 2008, only a total of twelve percent of bank loans were classified as either
held for sale or held for investments. Sanders Shaffer, Fair Value Accounting: Villain or In-
nocent Victim 12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Quantitative Analysis Unit, Working Paper
No. QAUt0-1, 2010), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/
qaul0l.htm; see also Mary E. Barth & Wayne R. Landsman, How did Financial Reporting
Contribute to the Financial Crisis? 19 Eur. Acct. Rev. 399, 405-07 (2010) (arguing that fair
value-related charges apply to a limited number of banks).
146 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 137, at 47.
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at all, despite the fact that banks' market values have declined precipi-
tously in the crisis."'147 The second example involves banks' estimates of
losses for loans that, because they were expected to be held to maturity,
were carried on the balance sheet at historical cost. SFAS 107 nonethe-
less requires that the fair value of these loans be disclosed in the foot-
notes. Laux and Leuz find that the difference between the loans' amor-
tized cost and fair value was very much larger than the loss reserves
established by the banks. 48 Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven, too, find
that banks overstated the value of real estate loans during the crisis since
they were held on the balance sheet at cost.'49
The analytic problem with the argument against fair value accounting
is equally compelling. It is this: Fair value analysis identifies bank su-
pervisory capital requirements as the link between accounting disclosure
and the asset sales that are said to trigger a cascade of capital reductions,
additional asset sales, and reductions in lending. As accounting scholars
have stressed, however, this syllogism is incorrect, both normatively and
positively. As a normative matter, capital requirements are set by agen-
cies for the purpose of bank regulation, not for use by investors.' 50 As
the SEC stated in its recent study, "[f]inancial reporting is intended to
meet the needs of investors. While financial reporting may serve as a
starting point for other users, such as prudential regulators, the Staff rec-
ommends that U.S. GAAP should continue to be developed to satisfy the
needs of investors.''51 Like public stress tests, accounting standards that
increase relative efficiency illuminate financial circumstances that fi-
nancial regulators should address. Additionally, observability serves to
allocate political responsibility. Investor-focused accounting standards
that reveal capital deficits also force financial regulators to take political
responsibility for extending regulatory forbearance rather than burying
147 Laux & Leuz, supra note 137, at 111. For example, the authors report a study showing
that Bank of America carried on its balance sheet $80 billion in goodwill, amounting to more
than fifty percent of its equity, largely as a result of bank acquisitions, such as Fleet Boston,
MBNA, and LaSalle Bank, between 2004 and 2007. As late as the second quarter of 2009,
Bank of America had not recorded any reduction in the value of goodwill despite the re-
quirement that the value of goodwill created by an acquisition be assessed every year.
148 Id. at 114.
149 Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, Bank Valuation and Accounting Discretion During a
Financial Crisis, 106 J. Fin. Econ. 614, 615, 621 (2012).
150 Barth & Landsman, supra note 145, at 407 ("[I]t is the responsibility of bank regulators,
not accounting standard setters, to determine how best to mitigate the effects of procyclicali-
ty on the stability of the banking system.").
151 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 137, at 206.
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the problem under opaque accounting standards such as historical cost.
Thus, separating accounting standards from regulatory standards makes
financial regulators politically accountable for their decisions.
In short, the FASB's relaxation of fair value accounting rules in re-
sponse to political pressure gets it backward. Accounting standards
should increase relative informational efficiency, which calls for
strengthening, not relaxing, the disclosure of market valuations. As ac-
counting scholars Mary E. Barth and Wayne R. Landsman conclude,
"transparency of information associated with measurement and recogni-
tion of accounting amounts relating to, and disclosure of information
about, asset securitizations and derivatives likely were insufficient for
investors to assess properly the values and riskiness of affected bank as-
sets and liabilities."' 2 Matters of prudential regulation, including espe-
cially regulatory decisions that relax capital requirements in the cause of
macroeconomic goals, should be transparent and subject to political ac-
countability.
B. Market Structure and Price Efficiency
If lower information costs are one pillar of efficient asset prices,
smoothly functioning trading markets are the other. As Part III indicated
above, overlaying a primary market on an actively traded secondary
market may, by accident or design, dissipate the value of the information
already aggregated by the underlying secondary market. This was one
structural problem that arose in the Subprime Crisis. The second prob-
lem of market structure was pervasive reliance on OTC or bilateral mar-
kets and bespoke assets, both of which hampered the aggregation and
distribution of market-wide price and volume information. When viewed
from an ECMH perspective, both of these problems suggest more or less
obvious solutions. Again, the key questions are whether the suggested
solutions are cost effective and whether they require regulatory interven-
tion.
1. Trading in Proxy Instruments
Commentators on the Subprime Crisis generally agree that the intro-
duction of mortgage-backed securities markets hastened the eventual
152 Barth & Landsman, supra note 145, at 401.
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collapse of the housing bubble.'53 As described in Part III, two derivative
products facilitated hedging and shorting mortgage-backed securities. In
chronological order, the first was CDS protection, which entered the
RMBS market in tradable form in mid-2005.'5 4 (By contrast, CDS pro-
tection written on specific CDOs was a one-off deal invisible to the larg-
er market.) The second shorting and hedging instrument encompassed
the ABX subprime indices that began to trade on an open exchange in
January 2006. Following Geanakoplos and Gorton, we believe that trad-
ing in these derivatives made a large difference. Something had to pop
the bubble, and it was already too late for a soft landing by the time that
these derivative markets had emerged.
Although Geanakoplos and Gorton see the auxiliary markets as accel-
erating the end of the bubble in different ways, both stress their im-
portance in impounding new information into RMBS prices. For
Geanakoplos, financial institutions such as AIG, Lehman Brothers,
Goldman Sachs, and other investment banks turned the switch by ag-
gressively selling CDS protection on RMBSs in 2005' and bespoke
protection on CDOs shortly thereafter. The customers for these deriva-
tives were hedge funds, arbitrageurs, and even issuers of CDOs them-
selves who sought to hedge exposure to the inventories of mortgage-
backed securities still on their shelves. According to Geanakoplos, "[b]y
buying [CDS protection], the pessimistsfor thefirst time could leverage
their negative views about bond prices and.., actively push bond prices
down.' ' 156 In Geanakoplos's view, the full force of CDS protection
emerged only as the numbers of contracts grew and market sentiment
153 See, e.g., Ferrell & Saha, supra note 81, at 98; Gorton, supra note 57, at 10;
Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 110.
154 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113; see also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Tranch-
ing, CDS, and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes, 4
Am. Econ. J. Macroeconomics 190, 191-93 (2012) (noting that in 2005, credit default swaps
were standardized for mortgages vis-A-vis CDS).
155 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113-14, speaks of standardized CDSs, but it is uncertain
when true standardized CDSs first became a force in the mortgage bond market. It may not
have been before the appearance of index-based CDSs in 2008.
156 Id. at 111 (emphasis added); accord Luigi Zingales, Credit Default Swaps on Trial, Pro-
ject Syndicate (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/credit-default-
swaps-on-trial; see also Fostel & Geanakoplos, supra note 154, at 194, 212-14 (arguing that
"[t]he underlying bond-asset is not tranched, but people can leverage their purchases of it").
Wallace, supra note 49, at 34-35, argues that because of the demand for insurance, the drop
in prices caused the instruments to trade at levels that overstated the default risk on the un-
derlying mortgages.
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slowly shifted, first against RMBS optimists and later against structured
mortgage-backed bonds generally. In this story, the good news is that
the bubble burst sooner than it would have otherwise. The bad news is
that the bursting bubble devastated the sellers of CDS protection, such as
AIG and Lehman Brothers. Nevertheless, "[h]ad the CDS market for
[RBMSs] been around from the beginning, asset prices might never have
gotten so high [in the first place]."' 57
As we suggested in Part III, we favor Gary Gorton's emphasis on in-
formation aggregation in the ABX market as the most powerful factor
channeling information about deteriorating housing prices into subprime
RMBS bonds, and-inevitably after a lag-eroding demand for AAA
bonds collateralized by CDOs that were heavily invested in lower-
tranche RMBS bonds. But regardless of the relative importance of these
mechanisms, the point is that innovative securities eventually gave birth
to derivatives that forced them to face up to bad news as well as good
news. The typical lags in securities development-the introduction of
the security first and the shorting vehicle six months later-suggest that
a regulator might intervene proactively to balance the reflection of in-
formation into the prices of innovative securities when market makers
seem sluggish to act on their own. Regulators might scrutinize rapidly
expanding markets in innovative securities-for example, the market in
securitized mortgage-backed securities-with a practical sense that not
all components of an efficient market inevitably fall into place at once.
Here, regulators can borrow from the playbook of market makers such
as Markit, the developer of the ABX index, by encouraging auxiliary
markets in which proxies can be traded and market-wide information re-
vealed. Chances are that market makers will not need much encourage-
ment to police the relative price efficiency in fast-growing trading mar-
kets. Perhaps regulatory encouragement and favorable publicity are all
that is needed.
An innovative but opaque primary market, however, seems like a dif-
ferent animal. Here there is little or no information aggregation through
trading. As a thought experiment, consider what might have occurred if
underwriters of mortgage-backed CDOs had been required to meet min-
imal standardization requirements in 2005 and a private market platform
157 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113; see also Fostel & Geanakoplos, supra note 154, at
216-17 (detailing that the price crash is much larger in CDS economies than in no CDS
economies).
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(such as Markit) had been invited to initiate trading in indices that refer-
enced individual tranches of the twenty largest CDOs issued in a given
period. One suspects that the sophisticated traders in the RMBS market
would soon have turned to shorting the AAA tranches of subprime mez-
zanine CDOs. In turn, the falling prices of the CDO indices might have
raised a red flag large enough to stir anxiety among even the most staid
institutional purchasers of these supposedly minimal-risk, fixed-return
bonds. And maybe, just maybe, the information would have caused the
regulators to notice the growing importance of the shadow banks.158 If
the handwriting was not yet on the wall, the falling prices of AAA CDO
bond indices might have written it there, perhaps a full six months be-
fore the last AAA bonds were placed prior to the worst of the actual
Subprime Crisis.
2. Redesigning Market Structure
Engineering unconventional auxiliary markets raises questions of
need and feasibility; reengineering existing markets to better inform
regulators raises even more difficult questions of policy and political
economy. Academics and policymakers have intensely debated the wis-
dom of Dodd-Frank's mandate to standardize derivatives (such as CDS
contracts) and shift their trading from traditional OTC markets to clear-
inghouse markets (termed the "central clearing counterparties" or
"CCPs" in the literature). 5 9 In a CCP market, the CCP itself is the coun-
terparty to both buyers and sellers. 60 We do not address here the tech-
nical aspects of such markets, or their effects on containing counterparty
trading risk, which loom large in the policy debate. Following our focus
158 See Gorton, supra note 56, at 157 (stressing the role of shadow banking in the trans-
formation of the Subprime Crisis into the Financial Crisis and the role played by the regula-
tors' lack of information about the shadow banks).
159 See, e.g., John Hull, CCPs: Their Risks, and How They Can Be Reduced, 20 J. Deriva-
tives 26, 26 (2012). For a discussion on how CCPs should be regulated to avoid excessive
systemic risk, see Darrell Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress, 9
Int'l J. Cent. Banking 251, 253, 266-73 (2013). For concerns about central clearinghouses
failing and becoming the next government-sponsored enterprises, see Viral V. Acharya et al.,
Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance
378-79 (2011). For an argument on central clearing's ability to lower the financial system's
cost of providing derivatives to hedge risks, see John E. Parsons, Hit or Miss: Regulating
Derivative Markets to Reduce Hedging Costs at Non-Financial Companies 2 (2012), availa-
ble at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/76235/2013-002.pdf.
160 See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Re-
duce Counterparty Risk?, 1 Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 74, 74 (2011).
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on the ECMH, our concern here is with the relative informational ad-
vantages of OTC and the CCP market structures.
One informational advantage claimed for the CCP model does in-
volve counterparty risk, however. A CCP market structure would pre-
vent regulatory surprises such as the horrific discovery that AIG was
rapidly facing insolvency as a result of extending CDS protection to a
large fraction of the mortgage-backed bond industry. A CCP structure,
in other words, would have alerted regulators and the mutual owners of
the CCPs themselves to rapid expansions and concentrations of purchas-
es and sales of CDS protection. 161 In addition, a CCP structure would
create a second important informational benefit by providing market
transparency and automatically generating low-cost information about
aggregate market prices and trading volume. 162 This, it is argued, would
markedly increase the informational efficiency of the derivative markets.
Curiously, however, the need for information to ensure rational pric-
ing and avoid moral hazard is also the most plausible information-based
argument against the CCP model. 163 CCP critics argue that shifting the
risk for counterparty losses from individual traders to the CCP as a
whole would diminish trader incentives to investigate the solvency of
their counterparties. This would subject a CCP market to both moral
hazard and potential adverse selection problems. The only way the CCP
could counter these problems would be to increase collateral require-
ments and tighten the rules screening out classes of potential counterpar-
ties. These protective measures, it is argued, would raise CCP transac-
tion costs well above the purported informational benefits of the CCP
regime. In addition, a collective failure to gather sufficient information
about counterparties would deprive traders of the information necessary
to make the most economical allocations of counterparty risks. Hence
trades would be less accurately-and hence less efficiently-priced.' 64
161 Darrell Duffle, Ada Li & Teo Lubke, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 424,
Policy Perspectives on the OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 17 (2010).
162 Id.
16' E.g., Alistair Milne, OTC Central Counterparty Clearing: Myths and Reality, 5 J. Risk
Mgmt. Fin. Institutions 335, 339-40 (2012); Craig Pirrong, CATO Inst., The Inefficiency of
Clearing Mandates 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/
pdf/PA665.pdf.
164 Pirrong, supra note 163, at 10-11; see also Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central
Clearing: Theory and Practice 13-14 (ISDA Discussion Papers Series, Paper No. 1, 2011),
available at http://www2.isda.org/attachmentMzEONA=/ISDAdiscussionCCPPirrong.pdf
(arguing that risk sharing mechanisms can distort incentives when there are information im-
perfections).
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Regulators would sacrifice existing OTC markets in a misguided attempt
to reduce systemic risk and generate aggregate market information.
Although this is a very crude account of the actual policy debate, it
suffices to make the point that various dimensions of information costs
are as important to evaluating single-level market reforms as they are to
addressing information cost issues in multi-layered markets.
CONCLUSION
This Article assesses the prominent post-Crisis claim that the mispric-
ing in the securities markets related to the Subprime Crisis demonstrates,
once and for all, the bankruptcy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypoth-
esis itself. We argue here, as we have previously, that the ECMH effi-
ciency is best understood as a theory about relative efficiency with
which public information is reflected in market prices. In the perfect
market of finance theory, all information is instantly reflected in prices
that are fundamentally as well as informationally efficient. In real capital
markets with active secondary trading, prices generally reflect public in-
formation rapidly-albeit not instantaneously. Information that is "pri-
vate" or costly to acquire enters price more slowly and sometimes not at
all. Similarly, prices in markets without an effective arbitrage mecha-
nism incorporate public information very slowly. These include primary
markets, markets for informationally insensitive securities, and markets
dominated by noise traders.
During the Subprime Crisis, multiple institutional frictions impeded
relative efficiency to varying degrees in the markets most closely associ-
ated with mortgage-backed securities. First, the critical information was
extremely costly to acquire: The evidence strongly indicates that few in-
vestors had real knowledge in 2005 and early 2006 that housing prices
would collapse during 2007. If the existence of a real estate bubble was
widely recognized, the timing of its collapse was not. And even if the
timing of a drop in housing prices had been known with some certainty,
assessing the implications for default risks and prices in the associated
securities markets was costly information to acquire, particularly in the
case of the CDS and stock markets. The implications of declining hous-
ing prices for publicly traded shares of financial institutions depended in
large part on the effect of declining prices on the value of AAA CDO
tranches. For a variety of reasons-ranging from inherent complexity
and idiosyncratic terms to a misplaced trust in rating agencies and the
absence of secondary trading-prices in the senior CDO "market" were
3732014]
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uniquely inefficient, just as the ECMH would have led us to expect them
to be. Only prices of RMBSs reacted with a modicum of efficiency to
early signs of weakness in the housing market and, even here, they be-
came informationally sensitive largely as the result of a market innova-
tion: the introduction of trading in the ABX.HE indices, which revealed
new information by greatly improving the efficiency of hedging and ar-
bitrage in the RMBS market. The market, in turn, became pessimistic in
early 2007 and began to panic soon thereafter. The early tremors in the
RMBS market collateralized by subprime and alt-prime mortgages even-
tually triggered tidal waves in the primary markets for CDOs and in the
secondary stock market for large financial institutions, but only during
the last quarter of 2007.
In our view, this chain of developments vindicates a modest form of
the ECMH that incorporates market frictions and focuses principally on
informational efficiency. It can be read to "refute" only an overblown
framing of market efficiency, which makes the claim that market prices
are fundamentally efficient in the sense of more or less accurately re-
flecting the discounted present value of the cash flows associated with
market securities. This quasi-empirical (and thoroughly immodest) claim
was the intellectual basis for advancing a broad agenda of deregulation
in the capital markets. But it never quite made sense, not merely because
it could not be tested directly, but more importantly because it failed to
acknowledge the range of market frictions that impede informational ef-
ficiency, which is itself a necessary condition for any degree of funda-
mental efficiency in market prices. Unfortunately, however, misframing
the ECMH as a strong and direct claim about the fundamental efficiency
of market prices without regard to market frictions or informational effi-
ciency has presented an easy target for the critics of market efficiency.
This criticism, which builds upon the Subprime Crisis and other recent
market shocks, threatens to remove all analysis of the efficiency of mar-
ket prices from the regulatory agenda. Our concern is that the limited but
genuinely helpful insights of a more modest ECMH will be lost in the
general condemnation of animal spirits and noise traders.
A properly framed ECMH focuses our attention on the frictions that
drive a wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect
market conditions. So framed, relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that
identifies the frictions and information costs that reduce price efficiency.
Relative efficiency thus provides part of a regulatory strategy to address
the problems raised by the Crisis. It will not prevent future bubbles and
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crises, but improving the performance of the mechanisms of market effi-
ciency will make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and
public sector agency costs more observable, which may in turn allow us
to catch the next problem earlier. This would be no small accomplish-
ment. Recall that as late as September 8, 2008, the Congressional Budg-
et Office was still uncertain whether a "period of slow growth [resulting
from the housing bubble] will ultimately be designated a recession," and
was predicting 1.1% growth in 2009.165 Eight days later, Lehman Broth-
ers had failed and AIG was being nationalized. While perfect markets
would be even better, a strategy of improving the relative informational
efficiency of the markets is itself a substantial improvement in a friction-
filled world and a prerequisite for fundamentally rational market prices.
165 Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update 23 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/41729.
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